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Before they reach the age of eighteen, almost one-third of the children
in the United States will experience the divorce of their parents.' Deserv-
edly, considerable scholarly attention has been paid to what happens to
those millions of children at the time of divorce. Members of the legal
profession and social scientists have debated at length the functions and
drawbacks of the "best interests of the child" standard traditionally used
to decide custody upon divorce.2
Little attention, however, has been paid in the literature to the fact that
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1. Dr. Paul Glick, Senior Demographer of the Population Division of the U.S. Census Bureau,
projects that this figure of one-third will be reached by 1990. Glick, Children of Divorced Parents in
Demographic Perspective, J. Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1979, at 170, 175. Another authority estimates that
forty to fifty percent of children born during the 1970's will spend some time living in a single-parent
home. Hetherington, Divorce: A Child's Perspective, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 851, 851 (1979).
2. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979); Beaber, Custody Quagmire: Some Psycholegal Dilemmas, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 309
(1982); Foster, Child Custody and Divorce: A Lawyer's View, 22 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY
392 (1983); Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pts. 1 & 2), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423 (1964), 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 615 (1964); Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Inde-
terminacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226; Pearson & Ring, Judicial Decision-
Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703 (1982-83); Watson, The Children of Arma-
geddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969); Weitzman &
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life continues after divorce and that the legal system continues to hold
open the custody issue long after the initial custody decision has been
made. This lack of attention is particularly surprising since there appear
to be more hearings and trials concerning the modification of custodial
arrangements than there are concerning initial custody decisions.3
The modification of custodial arrangements is such a hotbed of litiga-
tion in part because of the fluidity of the modern American family. To-
day's family is increasingly "extended," not in the sense of spanning gen-
erations but in the sense of shifting and expanding its membership.4
Noncustodial parents frequently urge modification of custody on the
ground of changes in circumstances that are common to many post-divorce
families. Consider the hypothetical case of the Smiths.
The divorce of John and Mary Smith was, like most divorces today,
accomplished by their joint consent. To arrive at their marital settlement,
Mr. and Mrs. Smith went through the usual negotiations about who got
what. Although Mrs. Smith obtained custody of the children, this was one
of the points negotiated, and in exchange for giving up custody and retain-
ing only a right of visitation,5 Mr. Smith bargained for and obtained
rights to marital property and income that Mrs. Smith otherwise would at
least have contested. After this negotiated settlement was incorporated into
a court order, Mrs. Smith went home with the children, and Mr. Smith
returned to his new bachelor's flat.
Mr. Smith, now relieved of domestic responsibility, was more able than
Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Sup-
port and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L REV. 473 (1979).
3. See Sharp, Modification of Agreement-Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard?, 68
VA. L. REV. 1263, 1264 n.8 (1982) (great majority of litigated custody decisions involve motions to
modify); cf. Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation: Modification
of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 495 (1975) (discussing custody modifications
after divorce).
4. See M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 3-4 (1981).
5. This comports with the traditional custody arrangement in which the mother is usually the
custodial parent and the father the noncustodial parent. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIV-
ING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE wiTH DIVORCE 121 (1980) (mothers ob-
tained custody in over 80% of the cases in the authors' study); Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Divorced
Fathers, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 417, 417 (1976) (as of 1975, only 8.4% of children of divorced
parents resided with their fathers); Messinger & Walker, From Marriage Breakdown to Remarriage:
Parental Tasks and Therapeutic Guidelines, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 429, 433 (1981) (in
approximately 90% of divorces, mothers receive sole custody of the children). This Article will refer to
the custodial parent by the feminine pronoun "she" simply because that nomenclature is accurate in
the vast majority of cases. Likewise, this Article will address the custodial modification problem in the
context of sole custodial arrangements despite the recent scholarly and legislative interest in joint
custody, because sole custodial arrangements are far more prevalent. See Abarbanel, Shared Parent-
ing After Separation and Divorce: A Study ofJoint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320, 320
(1979); Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.O.D. L. REv. 523,
540-41 (1979); Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAm. L.Q. 345, 353 (1979). In a survey of family law
practitioners, three-quarters reported the use of a joint custody arrangement in fewer than 15% of
their cases. Survey Report Profiles Members of ABA Family Law Section, 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA)
2683, 2685 (1982).
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Mrs. Smith to spend time socializing, and he soon found a "significant
other." Mrs. Smith, meanwhile, was hard pressed to control things at
home, for the children, upset by the divorce, were acting out their emo-
tional conflicts. Mrs. Smith coped as best she could, and she, too, sought
solace in the companionship of the opposite sex.
Mr. Smith's relationship with his new companion soon blossomed into
a second marriage. Settled down once more, Mr. Smith began again to
appreciate the values of family life which he had once enjoyed so well.
More and more, he yearned for his children to join him in his new home,
where, he thought, he and his new wife could give them a real family life.
Mr. Smith also perceived that the children's life with Mrs. Smith was
chaotic.
Accordingly, Mr. Smith consulted his matrimonial lawyer about ob-
taining custody. The lawyer informed Mr. Smith that the usual legal re-
quirement for changing an initial custody decision was a substantial
change in the circumstances of the parties. Under that standard, Mr.
Smith had a good chance of modifying the decree, because his remarriage
was a new circumstance in his favor, while Mrs. Smith's extramarital
relations with a member of the opposite sex could hurt her chances of
retaining custody. Moreover, Mr. Smith's attorney reported that there
was a trend in the law, including a recent decision by the prestigious New
York Court of Appeals,6 to dispense with the need to show changed cir-
cumstances at all, and to judge modification applications under a flexible
"best interests" standard, particularly when the prior order had been
based on an agreement between the parties, as in the Smith's case, rather
than on an adjudication by a court after trial. Mr. Smith's attorney coun-
seled that there was good reason to think that a modification of custody
was in the best interests of the Smith children-Mr. Smith now had a
stable family home, whereas the children were having difficulties under
the current custody arrangement.
The lawyer's advice proved correct. Mr. Smith was awarded custody.
Mrs. Smith was given standard visitation rights: She was allowed to see
her children one evening after school during the week and on alternate
weekends. All the incidents of custody-the right to make educational,
health, and other significant decisions regarding the children-were trans-
ferred to Mr. Smith.
The thesis of this Article is that only in the most myopic view of the
issues presented is anyone's interest served by legal standards that allow
such a result. Focusing on the post-divorce family as well as on the config-
uration of the family at the time of divorce, this Article argues that the
6. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982).
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law today is moving in precisely the wrong direction. There is a marked
trend toward making custody modifications fairly easy to obtain. Instead,
rigorous statutory criteria should firmly limit both the parents' ability to
bring such litigation and the courts' discretion to make such custodial
modifications. The Article points out that the current trend raises serious
constitutional issues that have not yet been addressed, or even acknowl-
edged, either by courts or commentators.
In arguing for a stricter standard, the Article relies on a growing body
of social science findings that dispute important assumptions routinely
made by the courts. These findings strongly suggest that divorce is a pro-
cess, not a fixed event, and that the custodial parent and child require a
period of time to adapt to the new post-divorce situation. Research indi-
cates that courts generally do not appropriately evaluate the various fac-
tors that affect the child's adjustment during this process. For example,
although courts have considered both the remarriage of the noncustodial
parent and the custodial parent's sexual activity as factors supporting an
application to modify custody, it appears that neither factor necessarily
supports such a change. When more meaningful variables are
considered-such as interparental conflict, residential changes, and the
young child's attachment needs-it becomes clear that custody modifica-
tion is justified only in special cases.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF MODIFICATION STANDARDS
The law in every state, whether statutory or common, permits the
courts to modify orders directing the custody of a child upon the divorce of
his or her parents.7 Even if the court that made the initial custody decree
did not reserve jurisdiction, the modifying court will exercise its power
either by express statutory authority or by its common law equity powers
over the welfare of children.8 The rule that jurisdiction is always available
applies whether the initial decree was consensual or resulted from
litigation.
While judicial power to modify is universally recognized, states vary as
to what showing the moving party in a modification application must
make to obtain relief. There are three such standards. One permits modi-
fication if there is a substantial change in circumstances that makes a
modification of custody in the child's best interests. An even more flexible
test allows modification if it is in the child's best interests regardless of
whether there has been any change in circumstances since the initial
7. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 17.7, at 598
(1968); 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTUAL CONTRACTS § 14, at 14-123
to 14-124 (rev. ed. & Supp. 1984).
8. H. CLARK, supra note 7, § 17.7, at 598-99.
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award. A third standard permits modification only consensually or upon a
showing of serious harm to the child. The first test will be referred to here
as the "traditional standard" because for many years it has been the con-
trolling doctrine in the great majority of jurisdictions. Recently, however,
the law has been gravitating away from the traditional test toward the
second, pure best interests test. The third standard has never been the law
in more than a few jurisdictions, and today the law seems to be more
hostile than ever to its relatively inflexible approach.
A. The Traditional Standard
The traditional custody modification standard allows modification of an
initial custody decree if the court determines that a subsequent, substantial
change of circumstances warrants a change of custody in order to promote
the best interests of the child.9 The party seeking to modify the decree
bears the burden of demonstrating both that a substantial change in cir-
cumstances has occurred and that a modification will be in the child's best
interests. In some states, this allocation of burdens is mandated by stat-
ute.10 In the majority of states, however, it represents judge-made law,
often adding a gloss to general statutes which provide that modification
may be ordered in a child's best interests.1
9. Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pt. 2), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 623 (1964). See, e.g., Nabors
v. Nabors, 418 So. 2d 143 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 418 So. 2d 155 (Ala. Civ. App.
1982); Ryan v. Ryan, 652 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Pact v. Pact, 70 Misc. 2d 100, 107, 332
N.Y.S.2d 940, 949 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1972); cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 984 (1979) (standard represents a compromise by
making agreements difficult though not impossible to reopen). There is sometimes the additional re-
quirement that the custodian's or child's circumstances change, rather than those of the noncustodian.
See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 409(b) 9A U.L.A. 211-12 (1973). But see Ivins v.
Jennings, 308 N.W.2d 75, 78 (Iowa 1981) ("A party seeking a change of custody must show a
superior claim, based upon an ability to minister to the child's needs more effectively than the custo-
dial parent."). Other courts consider proof of the unfitness of the custodial parent as a factor in the
changed circumstances/best interests test. See, e.g., Helgenberger v. Helgenberger, 209 Neb. 184, 306
N.W.2d 867 (1981) (mother's sexual conduct did not require custody modification under the best
interests test); Nowak v. Nowak, 65 A.D.2d 957, 410 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (declining
to change custody absent finding of custodial parent's unfitness even if other parent more fit). Another
variation requires proof that the change in circumstances be permanent as well as substantial. See,
e.g., Chislett v. Cox, 102 Idaho 295, 629 P.2d 691 (1981) (declining to change custody where evidence
failed to support movant's claim that a permanent change in conditions had occurred); In re Marriage
of Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 1980) (finding insufficient evidence of permanently changed
circumstances).
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7 (Supp. 1983) (party must show changed circumstances);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.260(1) (West Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.32(2) (1981 &
West Supp. 1984).
11. Compare Parker v. Parker, 269 Ala. 299, 303, 112 So.2d 467, 471 (1959) (requiring showing
of material change in conditions) with ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1977) (court may grant custody as seems
right and proper); compare Thompson v. Thompson, 213 Ark. 595, 212 S.W.2d 8, (1948) (finding
insufficient evidence of material change adversely affecting child's welfare) with ARK. STAT. ANN. §
34-2726 (Supp. 1983) (best interests test for custody award); compare Hall v. Hall, 186 Conn. 118,
122, 439 A.2d 447, 449 (1982) (modification of custody award must be based on a material change of
circumstances which alters best interests of the child or on finding that original award not in best
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Under the traditional standard, the trial court has almost as much dis-
cretion in modification applications as it does in making the initial award
of custody-which is to say a great deal of discretion. The court decides
what constitutes a change in circumstances and whether that change has
an impact on a child's interests on the facts of each case, and the court's
appraisal of the individuals and circumstances before it is accorded great
weight on any appeal.
Custody litigation, unlike most other litigation, attempts to predict the
future rather than to understand the past. 2 In most other litigation, the
result will depend upon the court's determination that some event did or
did not take place at an earlier time. 3 Aside from possibly bearing on
credibility, the litigants' personality, priorities, lifestyle, financial re-
sources, emotional stability, and other personal attributes have no rele-
vance to the outcome. In custody litigation, however-at least under the
best interests and traditional modification standards-those very factors
will determine the result in large measure, with the court making a judg-
ment as to whether the child is likely in the future to be "better off" with
one parent than with the other. Not surprisingly, decisions made in this
framework are less a product of reasoned application of precedent than of
the personality, temperament, background, interests, and biases of the trial
judge or of the community that elected him.
Moreover, appellate judges with only a trial record before them are
reluctant to second-guess the assessment of the trial judge. This reluctance
is considerably greater than an appellate court's normal reluctance to im-
pose its own views when the application of a legal rule turns heavily on
fact finding. Because the legal rules involved-changed circumstances, best
interests of the child-are so imprecise, it is difficult for any court that
conceives of its function as one of review rather than de novo decisionmak-
ing to disagree with a trial court's decision. In addition, appellate judges
may believe that the application of the legal rules to the facts involves an
assessment of intangibles that only the trial court can truly perceive and
evaluate.
1 4
There are, of course, some restraints on what a trial court may do. The
traditional modification standard requires a finding that a significant
interests of child) with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Supp. 1984) (court shall apply best
interests test); compare Gibson v. Gibson, 196 Or. 198, 213, 247 P.2d 757, 763 (1952) (parent seek-
ing modification has burden of showing change in circumstances) with OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137
(1981) (best interests test).
12. Mnookin, supra note 2, at 250-52.
13. Id. at 250-51.
14. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 117 Ariz. 249, 253, 571 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) ("A
child custody proceeding more than any other court hearing challenges the trial judge to view and
weigh the various personalities, motives and abilities of all the parties.").
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change in circumstances actually occurred, and the best interests prong of
the test often at least gives lip service to the social policy that stability and
continuity are usually in a child's best interests.15
Yet the principle of finality is foreign to custody litigation under this
test. Normally, a party may not relitigate a claim based on facts known at
the time of the earlier trial; even to reopen a case on the basis of new
evidence, a litigant must satisfy a heavy burden.16 In custody proceedings,
however, the traditional modification standard virtually invites relitiga-
tion. A custodial decree is res judicata only as to what was then before the
court; it is final only until conditions affecting the child's best interests
change.
17
The traditional standard's "prior unknown facts exception" doctrine,
recognized in many jurisdictions, further undermines the principle of fi-
nality. Under this rule, even facts that existed at the time of the initial
decree but were not brought to the court's attention are admissible in a
modification proceeding.' A custody decree, therefore, is res judicata only
15. Thus, for example, in Wout v. Wout, 32 A.D.2d 709, 710, 300 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1969), the court stated that the "overriding consideration of the child's welfare dictates that a
continual shifting back and forth of custody should be avoided whenever possible." See J. GOLDSTEIN,
A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 2, at 31-39; Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 498; Watson, supra
note 2, at 71; see also In re Marriage of Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d 670, 671 (Iowa 1980) ("once custody
of children has been fixed it should be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons"); In re Marriage of
Melton, 256 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Iowa 1977) ("settled principle that once custody is fixed it should
seldom be disturbed and only then for the most cogent reasons"); Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242,
250, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (1977) (continual shifting to be avoided); De Francesco
v. MacNary, 74 A.D.2d 966, 967, 425 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) ("usually in the
best interest of the child to avoid shifting custody from one parent to another whenever possible"). In
addition, courts recognize that the potential for continual relitigation under claims of changed circum-
stances is detrimental to children's welfare because of the likelihood that parents will use their chil-
dren as weapons for hurting each other. See H. JAMES, WHAT MAISIE KNEW 4-5 (1897) (parents,
each awarded custody for six months annually, "had wanted [the child], not for any good they could
do her, but for the harm they could, with her unconscious aid, do each other"); see, e.g., Helgenberger
v. Helgenberger, 209 Neb. 184, 187, 306 N.W.2d 867, 869 (1981) (children are not chattels and
should not be the subject of continual contest between divorced parents at expense of their well being);
Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1977) (continual relitigation as to
which parent should have custody not in long range best interests of child and may encourage child
snatching); Buchholz v. Sogge, 303 N.W.2d 115, 116 (S.D. 1981) (courts, parties, and children must
be protected from endless and vexatious litigation and resulting uncertainty).
16. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70-71 (1980) (burden on party
seeking relief from judgment based on mistake or procured by corruption, duress or fraud).
17. See, e.g., Whaley v. Whaley, 61 Ohio App. 2d 111, 113, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (1978)(ex-
ception to rule of finality of judgments if a change of circumstances necessitates a change of custody to
serve child's best interests); Hershey v. Hershey, 85 S.D. 85, 90, 177 N.W.2d 267, 270 (1970) (decree
is res judicata unless substantial change of circumstances affecting child's welfare is shown).
18. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 408 So. 2d 114, 116 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981), cert. denied, 408 So.
2d 117 (Ala. 1982); Henkell v. Henkell, 224 Ark. 366, 369, 273 S.W.2d 402, 404 (1954); Smith v.
Smith, 212 So. 2d 117, 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Warren v. Warren, 191 N.W.2d 659, 661
(Iowa 1971). Some state statutes and the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act recognize this exception.
See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.410 (Vernon Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.260
(West Supp. 1985). The UMDA restricts its application by stating that the court may consider facts
unknown to it at the time of the prior decree, but that it may not grant a modification unless one of
three alternate standards are met. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 409, 9A U.L.A. 211
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as to the facts actually presented to the court. A party seeking a custody
modification need not in these jurisdictions show that circumstances subse-
quent to the decree require a change, only that matters existing at the
time of the earlier adjudication, but of which the court was unaware,
should be considered in making the custodial determination. A court's
willingness to use the prior unknown facts exception to alter an initial
custody decree will no doubt depend on whether the new evidence would
have a substantial impact on the best interests determination.19
In most civil litigation, courts will entertain such new evidence only if,
inter alia, it was "newly discovered," as provided in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.2" Some states do require the moving party in a custody
modification proceeding to demonstrate that the newly advanced facts
were unknown to him at the time of the earlier decree and could not have
been ascertained with due diligence.2 ' Most states, however, impose no
such requirement; the court's only concern is whether the newly advanced
facts were within the court's, not the party's, knowledge.22 Courts justify
(1973); infra p. 774-75.
Modification has also been permitted under the prior facts exception if there are facts demonstrat-
ing fraud or misrepresentation at the time of the initial decree. See, e.g., Swycaffer v. Swycaffer, 271
P.2d 585 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (modifying custody order in situation of extrinsic fraud); Juri v.
Juri, 61 Cal. App. 2d 815, 143 P.2d 708 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943) (fraudulent misrepresentations
would justify modification); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 69 Idaho 341, 206 P.2d 523 (1949) (same);
Gibson v. Gibson, 196 Or. 198, 247 P.2d 757 (1952).
19. Thus, when urged to consider prior unknown facts, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled
that
the movant has the burden to establish not only that these facts would, if they had been known
to the court, have had a material effect upon that court's determination of the question involv-
ing custody of the children, but to also show that it would now be for the best interest of said
child to modify the original order ....
Weatherall v. Weatherall, 450 P.2d 497, 499 (Okla. 1969). See also Gantner v. Gantner, 39 Cal. 2d
272, 246 P.2d 923 (1952); Stratton v. Stratton, 87 Idaho 118, 391 P.2d 340 (1964). Other courts are
more lenient in admitting evidence, particularly when the facts sought to be introduced relate to pre-
divorce parental conduct of which the court disapproves. See, e.g., Mathewson v. Mathewson, 207
Cal. App. 2d 532, 24 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1962) (mother's deceitful and immoral conduct sufficient to
overcome presumption that child be placed with the mother); Harwell v. Harwell, 253 Iowa 413, 112
N.W.2d 868 (1962) (adultery not known at time of decree constitutes a "change in circumstances");
Youngberg v. Youngberg, 193 Neb. 394, 227 N.W.2d 396 (1975)(mother's meretricious relationship
did not require change in custody where mother was trying to stabilize and legalize the relationship).
But see Swindle v. Swindle, 242 Ark. 790, 415 S.W.2d 564 (1967) (where parent failed to produce
evidence available to him at time of custody hearing regarding custodial parent's illicit relations, he
may not rely on that evidence in later modification proceeding); Merrill v. Merrill, 167 Cal. App. 2d
423, 334 P.2d 583 (1959) (evidence of acts known prior to entry of decree cannot show a change of
conditions); Carney v. Franklin, 207 Ga. 39, 59 S.E.2d 909 (1950) (same); Baker v. Baker, 119 Utah
37, 49, 224 P.2d 192, 197-98 (1950) (trial court properly rejected evidence concerning incidents
which occurred prior to divorce hearing).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) further provides that to be admissible, such evidence could
not, by due diligence, have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) (requir-
ing motion for new trial to be served not later than ten days after entry of judgment).
21. See, e.g., Gantner v. Gantner, 39 Cal. 2d 272, 276, 246 P.2d 923, 927 (1952); Olson v. Olson,
95 Cal. App. 594, 597, 272 P. 1113, 1114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928); Ness v. Ness, 357 P.2d 973, 975
(Okla. 1960); Rowles v. Reynolds, 29 Tenn. App. 224, 196 S.W.2d 76 (1946).
22. See, e.g., Sparkman v. Sparkman, 217 Ala. 41, 114 So. 580 (1927); Meadows v. Meadows, 78
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this approach by what they perceive as the overriding need to serve and
protect the welfare of the child. As one court stated:
[O]ur recent emphasis has been on what the decretal court actually
knew, not on what the parties knew, should have known or should
have produced at the earlier trial. This has been necessitated by our
continued adherence to the principle that the best interest of the
child is the governing consideration.23
In sum, under the traditional modification standard, child custody deci-
sionmaking may be characterized as highly flexible. It may also fairly be
characterized as highly undisciplined and highly uncertain. Relitigation is
not discouraged, out of concern that freezing a relationship may damage
the innocent child. The interest of the child is the focus of the inquiry; the
determination of the child's best interests is necessarily subjective and dis-
cretionary; and that determination is subject to reconsideration and revi-
sion as the spectrum of amorphous factors that can influence the determi-
nation changes over time. The sole brake on this broad power to modify is
the requirement that the moving party must show either that some change
has occurred since the initial custody award or that some material fact
was overlooked at the time of that decree.
B. Relaxing the Traditional Flexible Requirements for Modification
There is today a discernible trend toward relaxing the already loose
traditional custody modification standard. Recently, several state courts
have held that a pure best interests standard, rather than a standard of
changed circumstances, should apply to applications to modify an initial
custody award to which the parents had consented. 4 Other courts, while
Fla. 576, 83 So. 392 (1919); Stewart v. Stewart, 86 Idaho 108, 383 P.2d 617 (1963); Serotzke v.
Serotzke, 335 Il1. App. 485, 82 N.E.2d 375 (1948); Warren v. Warren, 191 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa
1971); Hill v. Hill, 228 Kan. 680, 620 P.2d 1114 (1980); Person v. Person, 172 La. 740, 135 So. 225
(1931); In re Custody of R.L.S., 632 P.2d 703 (Mont. 1981), modified on other grounds sub. noma.
R.L.S. v. Barkhoff, 674 P.2d 1082 (Mont. 1983); Commonwealth ex reL Moss v. Moss, 159 Pa.
Super. 133, 47 A.2d 534 (1946); In re Marriage of Timmons, 94 Wash. 2d 594, 617 P.2d 1032
(1980); Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
23. Warren v. Warren, 191 N.W.2d 659, 661 (Iowa 1971). At least one other court has suggested
another rationale. In Simons v. Simons, 172 Conn. 341, 374 A.2d 1040 (1977), the court first found
that none of the facts presented constituted a material change of circumstances affecting the welfare of
the child. It then held that other facts, predating the initial custody award, were determinative and
required a modification of custody. 172 Conn. at 344-346, 374 A.2d at 1042-43. The court reasoned
that at the time of the initial decree, the parties (and presumably the court as well) had focused
primarily on the issue of the termination of the marriage. "[U]nder this pressure," stated the court,
"some custody awards may be made which are not in the best interests of the child." 172 Conn. at
347, 374 A.2d at 1043.
24. Cases in which custodial decrees were based on default divorces, stipulations, or separation
agreements will all be referred to in this Article as nonlitigated or "consensual" decisions. Most courts
do not distinguish among these situations because in each case the custodial decision was not judicially
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not expressly abolishing the changed circumstances standard, have reached
the same result in the case of consensual initial awards by using the prior
unknown facts exception.2" Still other courts have simply abandoned the
changed circumstances standard in favor of a pure best interests test in
both consensual and non-consensual cases.26
1. A "Best Interests" Test for Modification of Consensual Initial
Decrees
Kansas is representative of several jurisdictions whose courts have re-
cently rejected the changed circumstances rule for nonlitigated decrees. In
a series of cases prior to 1980, Kansas' highest court had clearly estab-
lished that prior orders of custody, whether based on the parties' agree-
ment or on evidence presented at a contested hearing, could be modified
only on a showing of a material change in circumstances.2 7 Then, in 1980,
in Hill v. Hill,28 the Kansas Supreme Court reevaluated the issue.
At the time of their divorce, Mr. and Mrs. Hill had agreed that Mrs.
Hill was to have custody of their son, and this agreement was incorpo-
rated in a default divorce decree. Four months after the divorce was
granted, Mr. Hill filed a motion to change custody. In support of his
application, Mr. Hill showed that his former wife was living with an
unmarried male, a situation he had discovered "'around the time of the
divorce.' ' '29 Although the evidence indicated that Mr. and Mrs. Hill both
loved and wanted their child and would give him good physical care, the
imposed.
25. The prior unknown facts exception does not logically apply in cases where there has been no
prior litigation. In such cases there were no facts previously before the court; therefore, there can be
no facts which the parties or the court have overlooked. As the court stated in Wilson v. Wilson, 408
So. 2d 114 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981):
Although facts disclosed to the court and considered by it in fashioning the original custody
decree cannot be "rehashed" in a subsequent modification proceeding, facts existing at the time
of the original divorce decree but not disclosed at that time may be considered by the court in a
subsequent modification proceeding, even though these facts do not relate to a change of cir-
cumstances subsequent to the original divorce decree ...
The provisions of the original divorce decree were, in the present case, based upon the
stipulations and agreement of the parties. Apparently, no testimony concerning the child cus-
tody issue was offered. Under such circumstances, facts relating to the parties' pre-divorce
conduct should be considered by the trial court in a modification proceeding.
Id. at 116 (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Randolph v. Dean, 27 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916, 327 N.E.2d
473, 475 (1975); In re Marriage of Timmons, 94 Wash. 2d 594, 617 P.2d 1032 (1980).
26. There are also decisions in several states permitting de novo hearings only in cases involving
nonlitigated decrees from sister states. See, e.g., Mirras v. Mirras, 202 So. 2d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 386 A.2d 366 (1973); Brooks v. Brooks, 530 P.2d 547 (Or. Ct.
App. 1975). These decisions, of course, raise troublesome jurisdictional and conflict of laws issues.
27. See Simmons v. Simmons, 223 Kan. 639, 576 P.2d 589 (1978); Hardenburger v.
Hardenburger, 216 Kan. 322, 532 P.2d 1106 (1975); Hardman v. Hardman, 203 Kan. 825, 457 P.2d
86 (1969).
28. 228 Kan. 680, 620 P.2d 1114 (1980).
29. Id. at 683, 620 P.2d at 1117.
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trial court granted Mr. Hill's motion because "'the child would be in a
better and more stable environment with the father."' 30 The intermediate
appellate court reversed that decision on the ground that Mr. Hill had not
proved a change of circumstances since the original custody order.3 1
The Kansas Supreme Court, announcing a new rule of law, reinstated
the trial court's decision. The court pointed out that, because the initial
custody award was consensual, no court had ever evaluated the facts and
the child's best interests. In such a case, the court reasoned, to require a
finding of changed circumstances before a court may modify custody
might conflict with the child's best interests:
[Wlhere a custody decree is entered in a default proceeding, and the
facts are not substantially developed and presented to the court, the
trial court may later, in its discretion, admit and consider evidence as
to facts existing at the time of the earlier order, and upon the full
presentation of the facts the court may enter any order which could
have been made at the initial hearing whether a "change in circum-
stances" has since occurred or not. 2
Thus, under this approach, the distinction between a litigated initial
custody award and a consensual award is material to a custody modifica-
tion application. A consensual award, according to the Kafisas Supreme
Court and the courts of at least four other states,3 3 is always subject to de
30. Id. at 682, 620 P.2d at 1116 (quoting the trial court). The 52-year-old brother of Linda Hill's
male friend also lived with them, although he was often away for four or five days at a time. When he
was there, he shared a room with Linda's son. As for Linda Hill's relationship with her friend, the
judge stated: "'I suppose that there is absolutely not any way for me to not be somewhat prejudiced
by that type of morality . . . .I don't condone people living together that are single, and I assume in
most states it's against the law."' Id. at 681, 620 P.2d at 1116 (quoting trial court). For these reasons
the trial judge found that the father would provide a better and more stable environment.
31. Id. at 682-83, 620 P.2d at 1117 (quoting trial court).
32. Id. at 685, 620 P.2d at 1119. In Anhalt v. Fesler, 6 Kan. App. 2d 921, 636 P.2d 224 (1981),
a lower court expanded the holding of Hill v. Hill and eliminated the changed circumstances require-
ment for the modification of custody decrees entered upon the written stipulation of the parties.
33. The four states are Washington, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Illinois. Under WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.09.260(1) (Supp. 1984), patterned after the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the
"court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen
since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change
has occurred." In Timmons v. Timmons, 94 Wash. 2d 594, 599-600, 617 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1980),
the court concluded that pre-decree facts were "unknown" within the meaning of the statute whenever
a dissolution was uncontested. See also McDaniel v. McDaniel, 14 Wash. App. 194, 196, 539 P.2d
699, 701 (1975) (facts not permitted into evidence at previous hearing considered unknown); Rankin
v. Ferriter, 76 Wash. 2d 533, 537, 458 P.2d 176, 179 (1969) (where prior decree by default, it cannot
be assumed that the court knew all the circumstances).
In Kolb v. Kolb, 324 N.W.2d 279 (S.D. 1982), the Supreme Court of South Dakota eliminated the
substantial change of circumstances test for modifying custody awards based on prior agreements,
ruling that a full custody hearing under a best interests review was appropriate.
Whether Wisconsin and Illinois have adopted a dual standard is less clear. In Wisconsin the stan-
dard for modification of nonlitigated decrees differs from that for an initial award of custody because
in modification cases the moving party has the burden of proof. In 1977, the Wisconsin statute was
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novo judicial review under a pure best interests standard. If initial custody
was awarded after litigation, those states would still apply the traditional
modification test.
2. The Prior Unknown Facts Doctrine Applied to Consensual
Awards.
Courts in other jurisdictions have used a variant of the prior unknown
facts doctrine to avoid the changed circumstances requirement in cases in-
volving prior uncontested decrees. 4 While theoretically utilizing a
changed to require that a custody modification be based "on a finding that such removal is necessary
to the child's best interest as shown by substantial evidence supporting a change in custody." Wis.
STATS. ANN. § 767.32(2) (West 1981). The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in Groh v. Groh, 110
Wis. 2d 117, 127, 327 N.W.2d 655, 660 (1983), that this statute left intact the common law rule that
an award of custody made pursuant to a stipulation of the parties is not res judicata on the issues
surrounding a custody determination. Instead, in an application to modify a custody decree based on
agreement, evidence of the party's pre- and post-custody conduct may be adduced, but the noncus-
todial parent has the burden of showing by substantial evidence that a change of custody is in the best
interests of the child. See also Delchambre v. Delchambre, 86 Wis. 2d 538, 273 N.W.2d 301 (1979)
(applying change of circumstances test); Freye v. Freye, 56 Wis. 2d 193, 197, 201 N.W.2d 504, 506
(1972) (when original custody based on stipulation, parties in subsequent litigation have equal burden
to show best interests of child); Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 157-58, 138 N.W.2d 185,
192 (1965) (previously existing but undisclosed facts may be admitted); Corcoran v. Corcoran, 109
Wis. 2d 36, 42-43, 324 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Ct. App. 1982) (under § 767.32(2), burden of proof is on
the moving party). For a decision regarding the evidence necessary to establish a change in circum-
stance justifying a custodial modification, see Gould v. Gould, 116 Wis. 2d. 493, 342 N.W.2d 426
(1984).
In Illinois a majority of the lower appellate courts have applied different standards for litigated and
nonlitigated prior decrees, despite the adoption of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act standard
during this period. See, e.g., Blonsky v. Blonsky, 84 I11. App. 3d 810, 405 N.E.2d 1112 (1980); De
Franco v. De Franco, 67 Ill. App. 3d 760, 384 N.E.2d 997 (1979); Boggs v. Boggs, 65 Ill. App. 3d
965, 383 N.E.2d 9 (1978); McDonald v. McDonald, 13 Ill. App. 3d 87, 89, 299 N.E.2d 787, 789
(1973). But see In re Custody of La Marca, 78 I11. App. 3d 26, 397 N.E.2d 31 (1979) (in determin-
ing suitability of child's present environment, it is irrelevant that original custody arrangement was by
agreement).
34. The Idaho courts announced this rule in the 1960's. See Stratton v. Stratton, 87 Idaho 118,
391 P.2d 340 (1964); Stewart v. Stewart, 86 Idaho 108, 113-14, 383 P.2d 617, 619-20 (1963);
McMurtrey v. McMurtrey, 84 Idaho 314, 318, 372 P.2d 403, 405 (1962). More recently, the Idaho
Supreme Court has emphasized the requirement of material and substantial changes in circumstances
subsequent to the entry of the original decree even in cases involving parental stipulations as to cus-
tody. See Chislett v. Cox, 102 Idaho 295, 629 P.2d 691 (1981). The earlier cases have not, however,
been overruled and there are other indications that in the appropriate case, the Idaho courts will
consider facts that occurred prior to the initial custody decree. See Cope v. Cope, 98 Idaho 920, 576
P.2d 201 (1978); Poesy v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 561 P.2d 400 (1977). In the 1970's, Iowa and
South Carolina adopted the approach of the early Idaho cases. See Warren v. Warren, 191 N.W.2d
659, 661 (Iowa 1971); Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 144, 245 S.E.2d 612, 616 (1978). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska has flirted with adopting a similar standard. In 1978 that court
indicated that evidence that a party had been aware of facts concerning custody but had failed to bring
these facts to the court's attention would itself constitute a material change of circumstances. Cline v.
Cline, 200 Neb. 619, 620, 264 N.W.2d 680, 682 (1978). In Cline the mother contended that, in
reliance on her husband's promise that he would give her custody at a later time, she had agreed not
to appear in the divorce proceedings. Arguably, therefore, the husband had received custody fraudu-
lently. Although the decision's language did not limit the admission of prior facts to cases involving
fraud or misrepresentation, later cases have so interpreted the court's ruling. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Kuhn,
204 Neb. 363, 367-69, 282 N.W.2d 43, 46 (1979); see also Carper v. Rokus, 194 Neb. 113, 116-18,
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changed circumstances standard, these courts permit consideration of all
facts and circumstances relating to custody, including those existing prior
to the initial consensual award of custody, in ruling on a modification
petition.
Newsome v. Newsome3" illustrates this developing authority. Mr. and
Mrs. Newsome were separated in September 1976 and divorced in Octo-
ber 1977. Before the Newsomes had agreed upon custody, but after Mr.
Newsome had moved out of the house in 1976, Virginia Gooding, an em-
ployee of the County Department of Social Services, moved in with Mrs.
Newsome and the Newsome's daughter, Amy. Pursuant to their separa-
tion agreement, Mrs. Newsome received custody of Amy. Mr. Newsome
later contended, and adduced proof, that Mrs. Newsome and Ms. Good-
ing had a homosexual relationship ever since Gooding had moved in.36
Mrs. Newsome's mother also testified that, shortly after the separation
but before the divorce, she had observed Ms. Gooding engage in overtly
sexual play with Amy."
The trial court granted Mr. Newsome's application for custody modifi-
cation and awarded custody to him. On appeal, Mrs. Newsome argued
that Mr. Newsome had not demonstrated any change in circumstance
subsequent to the initial custody decree because Ms. Gooding had begun
living with Mrs. Newsome and Amy before the custody agreement was
reached. Without such evidence, she contended, custody could not be
modified.
The appellate court said it "need not tarry long"38 on Mrs. Newsome's
argument. The reason for the requirement of a change in circumstance,
the court pointed out, is to prevent relitigation, and that assumes that
there has been litigation. "When, however, . . . facts pertinent to the cus-
tody issue were not disclosed to the court at the time the original custody
230 N.W.2d 468, 470-71 (1975) (refusing to adopt exceptional rule for default cases on the grounds
that proof offered as to prior facts lacked specificity and that, therefore, usual rule requiring evidence
of new facts and circumstances since the prior decree should apply).
35. 42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849 (1979). Newsome was decided by North Carolina's inter-
mediate appellate court. North Carolina law remains unclear on the issue. In Barnes v. Barnes, 55
N.C. App. 670, 286 S.E.2d 586 (1982), the plaintiff appealed the denial of a motion to modify cus-
tody, arguing that a showing of changed circumstances adversely affecting the child should not be
required where the question of custody had never been litigated. The court refused to accept this
argument, stating that case law clearly established the requirement of changed circumstances. The
analysis is incomplete because it failed to indicate whether the plaintiff either met or attempted to
satisfy the standard set forth in Newsome.
36. 42 N.C. App. at 418, 256 S.E.2d at 850.
37. Id. at 419, 256 S.E.2d at 851.
38. Id. at 424, 256 S.E.2d at 854.
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decree was rendered, courts have held that a prior decree is not res judi-
cata as to those facts not before the court." 9 The concern behind such
rules is plain. As the Newsome court put it:
Suppose, for instance, it should appear that, unknown to the first
judge, the child had been regularly confined to a closet for long peri-
ods of time or otherwise abused but those facts are made known to
the second judge. Surely it could not be said that the second judge is
powerless to act merely because the circumstances are the same in
that the abuse is no greater or the environment no worse than
before.40
Everyone would agree that a court in such a case should not be power-
less to act. But it is not at all clear that this expansion of the prior un-
known facts doctrine is the most appropriate rule of law pursuant to
which the court should act. If the court seeks to protect the present best
interests of the child, why should its inquiry focus on what facts existed
years ago when the consensual custody decree was entered? And why
should the court's power to intervene be limited to cases in which the
initial decree was consensual?
3. Pure "Best Interests": Complete Abandonment of the Traditional
Rule
A third developing line of authority holds that it is not necessary to find
any substantial change in circumstances before a custodial decree may be
modified-regardless of whether the unknown facts exception applies and
regardless of whether the initial decree was litigated or consensual.41 That
authority is perhaps best represented by the New York Court of Appeals
decision in Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer.42 Prior to Friederwitzer, the
New York Court of Appeals had adhered to the traditional changed cir-
cumstances standard.4"
39. Id. at 424-25, 256 S.E.2d at 854.
40. Id. at 426, 256 S.E.2d at 855.
41. See, e.g., Deivert v. Oseira, 628 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1981); King v. King, 477 P.2d 356, 360
(Alaska 1970) ("[T]he 'substantial change' of circumstances is not an initial obstacle which must be
overcome by either party in order to have the court redetermine custody. It is simply one of the factors
to be weighed .... "); Urquhart v. Urquhart, 196 Cal. App. 2d 297, 16 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1961);
Cope v. Cope, 98 Idaho 920, 576 P.2d 201 (1978); Posey v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 261, 561 P.2d
400, 403 (1977) (policy goal of changed circumstances standard to prevent continuous relitigation of
custody matters "is of secondary importance when compared to the best interest of the child, which is
the controlling consideration in all custody proceedings"); Kavanaugh v. Carraway, 435 So. 2d 697,
700 (Miss. 1983) ("When viewing the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether there has
been a material change of circumstances adversely affecting the children, the trial court must keep
foremost in mind the best interests of the children .... ).
42. 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982).
43. See, e.g., Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1977). The court
Vol. 94: 757, 1985
Child Custody Modification
In Friederwitzer the Court of Appeals announced that the standard for
custody modifications is nothing more and nothing less than the best inter-
ests of the child when all of the applicable factors are considered, and not
whether one or more circumstances exist that can be denominated new or
extraordinary. 4" In other words, modification applications are to be judged
by the same standard that controls the initial award of custody. The
Friederwitzer court also made clear that the totality of circumstances test
is not limited to cases involving unlitigated initial decrees. Even when the
prior award was the result of litigation, the best interests test governs the
modification proceeding. In determining what the child's best interests are,
however, the court should accord more weight to the initial custody award
if that award was based on a judge's decision after a plenary trial.45
The facts that moved the Court of Appeals to make this change in the
law deserve attention. Mr. and Mrs. Friederwitzer were divorced in July
1979. Pursuant to the parties' separation agreement; the decree provided
for joint custody of the couple's two daughters, and gave physical custody
to Mrs. Friederwitzer and visitation privileges to Mr. Friederwitzer. Nine
months later, in April 1980, when the children were aged eleven and
eight, the father applied to the court for sole custody."
Mr. Friederwitzer's case for custody modification consisted of three
points: Mr. Friederwitzer showed, first, that Mrs. Friederwitzer had at
times left her daughters home alone in their apartment in the evenings,
sometimes until as late as midnight, even though they told her they were
frightened. Second, he showed that, although Mrs. Friederwitzer claimed
to follow the tenets of Orthodox Judaism, she failed, except on rare occa-
sions, to take the girls to religious services on Saturdays, and she permit-
ted her boyfriend to stay in the apartment, share her bed, and turn on the
television during the Sabbath. Finally, Mr. Friederwitzer presented testi-
mony from the children. The older daughter, Lisa, said she wanted to live
had initially awarded custody of the two children to the father. One year after that court award, the
mother snatched the children and brought them to New York with her for the next 4 years. At that
time, the father applied to the New York courts for return of the children. The Court of Appeals
stated that the children, then aged 11 and 9, had a strong interest in not being shifted from one parent
to the other. Despite this interest in stability, the court ruled that the mother's custody for the past 4
years, without more, was not a change in circumstances sufficiently extraordinary to justify upsetting
the determination of the Michigan court. Id. at 250, 372 N.E.2d at 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172. The court
was concerned with deterring child abduction, but it is difficult to conceive of a more extraordinary
change in circumstances than separation from the parent with custody for 4 years.
44. 55 N.Y.2d 89, 95, 432 N.E.2d 765, 768, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (1982). The court also relied
on a procedural rule that a court retains jurisdiction to modify for reasons "'it finds appropriate
under the circumstances existing at the time application for that purpose is made to it."' Id. (quoting
22 N.Y.C.R.R. 699.9, Approved Forms, J13) (emphasis supplied by the court).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 91-92, 432 N.E.2d at 766-67, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 894-95.
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with her father. The younger daughter, Nicole, said she wanted to con-
tinue to live with her mother, but she also did not wish to be separated
from her sister.47
Mrs. Friederwitzer admitted at the modification hearing that she some-
times left the girls alone at night. She explained that most of those times
were evenings when she went to her therapist. She also stated that her
mother, whom her daughters knew they could call in case of a problem,
lived only twenty blocks away.48 As for the children's religious upbring-
ing, the trial judge tried without success to ascertain whether regular at-
tendance at Saturday services was required of Orthodox Jewish women.49
The separation agreement imposed no requirements with respect to the
religious upbringing of the children. The evidence showed that both girls
attended a Yeshiva and that Mrs. Friederwitzer maintained a Kosher
home.50 Mrs. Friederwitzer conceded that she found her relationship with
her male friend difficult to reconcile with the precepts of her religion.
51
Lisa testified that she was uncomfortable about her mother's relationship
with the man, but she admitted that she had not told either her mother or
the counselor her mother had taken her to, about her feelings.52
On the basis of this evidence, the trial court granted Mr.
Friederwitzer's motion, finding that Mrs. Friederwitzer was less fit than
Mr. Friederwitzer to have custody. The trial court found that Mrs.
Friederwitzer's personal affairs appeared to be of paramount concern to
her, "to the total exclusion of the best interests of her children."5 3 The
court further found, and relied upon the fact, that Mrs. Friederwitzer had
acted in violation of Orthodox Judaism.54
The trial court found Mr. Friederwitzer "more fit" than Mrs.
Friederwitzer even though he presented little evidence of his parental fit-
ness. The court did not examine his religious or sexual behavior, his care
for the children prior to the divorce, or his plans relating to their care if
his motion were granted. Mr. Friederwitzer did testify that he intended to
remarry. The court appears to have relied on that stated intention and
47. Id. at 92-93, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
48. Transcript at 318-320, Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, No. 21095/78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau
Cty. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Transcript].
49. Id. at 23-26.
50. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, No. 21095/78, unreported opinion at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nas-
sau Cty. Oct. 2, 1980).
51. Transcript, supra note 48, at 322.
52. Id. at 87-89.
53. 55 N.Y.2d at 92, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
54. Id.
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assumed that Mr. Friederwitzer could offer the children a "normal" two-
parent home.55
One seemingly critical piece of evidence concerning Mr. Friederwitzer
had been presented, but the court overlooked it. Lisa testified that her
father had told her that Mrs. Friederwitzer's boyfriend was the cause of
her parents' divorce. 51 It therefore seems that Mr. Friederwitzer himself
caused at least part of Lisa's discomfort with her mother's new
relationship.
The Friederwitzer facts have a familiar ring to them-they are similar
to those in the hypothetical Smith case and in many other modification
cases found in the reported decisions.57 One could argue that Mrs.
Friederwitzer lost custody58 because she was having difficulty coping with
the experience of divorce and sought professional assistance to help her
deal with her new situation; because she developed a relationship with a
man other than her former husband; and because one of her children was
uncomfortable with that new relationship. Conversely, Mr. Friederwitzer
gained custody without showing parental fitness. The New York courts
assumed that Mrs. Friederwitzer's difficulties weighed heavily in support
of the application for modification. As discussed below, this approach is
highly dubious.
C. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Standard
While the state courts are relaxing the traditional custody modification
standard, the model Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (the "UMDA"),
55. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, No. 21095/78, unreported opinion at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nas-
sau Cty. Oct 2, 1980). There was conflicting testimony about Mr. Friederwitzer's exercise of his
visitation rights. Mrs. Friederwitzer testified, with the aid of a calendar she had marked, that from
September 1979 until May 1980 he had seen the children on six entire weekends and one Sunday.
During one two and one-half month period, according to her notes, he had not seen them at all.
Compare Transcript, supra note 48, at 277-81 with id. at 199-201, 228-32.
56. Transcript, supra note 48, at 123-26.
57. Only the religious aspect of the case distinguishes it, yet that aspect of the case is equally
troubling. Mrs. Friederwitzer appears to have lost her children at least in part because she was in
some sense hypocritical about her religion. The court's personal reaction is a disturbing ground upon
which to base a modification decision. Courts should not evaluate whether religious principles and
practices are being adequately observed and religious training adequately given. Traditionally courts
have been careful not to intervene in the area of religion unless there is evidence of serious harm to
the children; none was presented in Friederwitzer. For a discussion of the use of religion as a factor in
custody cases see, e.g., Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May Be Unconstitutional:
Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25 (1981).
58. The court did not consider alternative remedies. Mrs. Friederwitzer had physical custody
only; the parents' agreement specified consultation on matters pertaining to the girls' health, welfare,
education, and upbringing. The court could have transferred physical custody to Mr. Friederwitzer,
but left both parents with joint custody. None of the courts that reviewed the case discussed the joint
custody issue or whether that arrangement made any difference to the applicable legal principles.
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written in 1970,'9 was designed to propel the law in the opposite direc-
tion. The UMDA standard is the third modification standard in use, al-
though it is the law in very few jurisdictions.
The UMDA's drafters believed that the child's interest in continuity
make ensuring the finality of a custody decree more important than deter-
mining which parent is the more fit custodian.60 They were also con-
cerned that noncustodial parents not be permitted to punish former
spouses with frequent motions to modify.6 Nonetheless, because the inter-
est in continuity might be outweighed by other interests, they recognized
that custody should be modifiable-but only in limited circumstances. Fi-
nally, the UMDA's drafters pointed to what they characterized as the
"real issue in modification cases" 62 -the effect of the change itself. They
sought to focus on that issue by requiring the courts to find, before order-
ing any change in custody, that "the harm likely to be caused by a change
of environment is outweighed by the advantages [of a change]." 63
With these as their guiding principles, the UMDA's drafters enunci-
ated a test that incorporates the traditional standard but then tightens it
considerably. The UMDA standard is set forth in three sentences. The
first provides: "[T]he court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless
it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or
that were unknown to the court at the time of the entry of the prior de-
cree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his
custodian, and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest
of the child."164 This is but a restatement of the traditional test. The next
sentence, however, contains significant new limitations:
In applying these standards the court shall retain the custodian ap-
pointed pursuant to the prior decree unless:
(1) the custodian agrees to the modification;
(2) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner
with consent of the custodian; or
(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his physi-
cal, mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm likely to be
caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its advantages
to him.
65
59. UNIP. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A § 101-506 (1973). The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act vas amended in 1971 and 1973.
60. Id. § 409, Commissioners' Note.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 409(b)(3).
64. Id. § 409(b).
65. Id. As a further deterrent to relitigation, the Act also provides that attorneys' fees and costs
shall be assessed against a party seeking modification if the court finds that the modification action is
vexatious and constitutes harassment. Id. § 409(c).
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Finally, the UMDA standard provides that the courts may not entertain
any application to modify an initial decree (whether consensual or court-
imposed) during the first two years after the initial award of custody un-
less the movant can show by affidavit "that there is reason to believe the
child's present environment may endanger seriously his physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health." 6
The UMDA represents a significant departure from the other stan-
dards of custody modification. Under the UMDA, no nonconsensual
change may ever be made unless the petitioner proves that there has been
some change that seriously endangers the child's health. Another signifi-
cant distinction is that the UMDA requires the courts to recognize and to
address the possibility that any change in custody may be harmful to the
child; it requires proof by the petitioner that the advantages of a change
outweigh such harm.
The UMDA's drafters also heralded what they called the statute's
"two-year waiting period following each modification decree."'67 The
drafters stated that the statute's affidavit procedure constituted a "'safety
valve' for emergency situations." 68
In fact, however, there is precious little distinction under the UMDA
between modification proceedings within two years of a decree and those
brought after the two-year period. To be sure, a noncustodial parent who
petitions within the two-year period must, before obtaining a hearing,
submit proofs by affidavit that "there is reason to believe that the child's
present environment may endanger seriously .. .his health."69 But to
prevail ultimately, any noncustodial parent must prove that "the child's
present environment endangers seriously his . . . health."70 Thus, the
substantive standard that petitioners must satisfy as a threshold matter in
the first two years is no more onerous than the standard that all petition-
ers must satisfy in order to prevail. The hurdle the UMDA places in the
path of proceedings within the first two years of a decree is wholly proce-
dural, and that procedural hurdle is hardly a high one. Because custody
litigation is highly charged with emotion, affidavit proofs can be expected
to be somewhat less than objective. For that reason, and also because
judges will likely be disinclined to decide such important issues on the
basis of the papers filed, the UMDA's waiting period seems to be some-
thing of a paper tiger. Its main practical effect may be to prevent consen-
sual modification within the first two years of a custody award.
66. Id. § 409(a).
67. Id. § 409, Commissioners' Note.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 409(a).
70. Id. § 409(b)(3).
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Very few states have adopted the UMDA standard. Only two, Colo-
rado and Kentucky, have statutes that fully incorporate the UMDA's pro-
visions. 1 Illinois had such a statute, but as of July 1982 the Illinois legis-
lature amended the law to permit the parties to stipulate to a modification
prior to the UMDA's two-year "waiting period." The new Illinois statute
also removes from the statute the prohibition on custody modification after
the "waiting period" unless certain findings are made; instead, the revised
Illinois statute provides for the traditional changed circumstances standard
after the expiration of the two-year period.7 2 Several other states have
enacted parts of the UMDA test. For example, Washington's statute
omits the two-year "waiting" limitation but otherwise follows the
UMDA.73 Arizona, meanwhile, applies the UMDA "waiting period"
rules for the first year after a custody decree but permits modification
thereafter in accordance with the same best interests of the child standard
used in deciding initial custody matters. 4
Despite the recent amendment to its statute, Illinois' case law still rep-
resents the largest body of judicial interpretation of the UMDA test.
While the UMDA provisions 5 were in effect, from October 1, 1977 until
July 1, 1982, the state appellate courts decided a large number of cases
interpreting these provisions. Some of those decisions focused on the pro-
cedural aspects of the statute. 6 In perhaps the most important such proce-
dural decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled in 1979 that, to sup-
port a modification of custody, a trial court must explicitly find that one of
71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-131 (Supp. 1983); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.340 (1984).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610 (1982).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.260(1) (Supp. 1982).
74. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (West Supp. 1983-84). See also MINN. STAT. § 518.18
(West Supp. 1982) (permits modification within one year if there is "persistent and wilful denial or
interference with visitation"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-219 (1978) (omits two year limitation but
otherwise approximates the UMDA standards for modification); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08
(Vernon 1975) (provides for one year waiting limitation subject to an endangerment exception, but
otherwise provides for change of circumstances test).
75. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(a)(b).
76. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Braje, 85 I11. App. 3d 744, 407 N.E.2d 1091 (1980); In re
Marriage of Swift, 76 Ill. App. 3d 154, 394 N.E.2d 923 (1979); In re Marriage of Farris, 69 Ill.
App. 3d 1042, 388 N.E.2d 232 (1979). In 1981, the Supreme Court of Illiniois held that the affidavit
requirement was not intended as a limitation of the subject matter jurisdiction of a court otherwise
competent to hear and decide a case. In re Custody of Sexton, 84 Ill. 2d 312, 418 N.E.2d 729 (1981).
The Illinois courts failed to discuss substantively the facts necessary to meet the standard set out in
§ 610(a). In In re Marriage of Farris, 69 Il1. App. 3d 1042, 1044, 388 N.E.2d 232, 234 (1979), the
court stated that although the petitioner's affidavit lacked desirable specificity, any failure to comply
more closely with the dictates of § 610(a) did not amount to reversible error. By comparison, in three
Montana cases, petitioners lost either because they did not submit the prescribed affidavits or because
those they did submit did not properly set forth facts supporting the requested modification. See Ham-
ilton v. Hamilton, 176 Mont. 488, 580 P.2d 104 (1978); Strouf v. Strouf, 176 Mont. 406, 578 P.2d
746 (1978); Olson v. Olson, 175 Mont. 444, 574 P.2d 1004 (1974).
The state of Washington's statute does not contain a section comparable to UMDA § 409(a). It
does, however, require the filing of an affidavit with supporting facts establishing adequate cause
before a modification hearing can be held. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.270 (Supp. 1982). In
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the UMDA's prerequisites for a change of custody had been satisfied;
those statutory prerequisites, the court said, were not simply an aid or
guideline for an appellate court but were "indispensable requirements of
the statute.""'
The Illinois decisions shed light on the meaning of several of the
UMDA prerequisites. For example, when does something sufficiently
"endanger seriously" the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health so as to support a modification of custody? And, in determining
whether a change should be made, how should a court weigh the harm
likely to be caused by the change against the potential advantage of a
change ?78
In some cases, the Illinois courts relied upon rather meager facts to
satisfy the UMDA's serious endangerment test. For example, one trial
court found serious danger to a child in her present environment because
she "is not achieving her potential, although she is doing well in school,
she is not putting out her best. . . . Rachel is suffering from lack of nur-
turing. She is suffering from pseudomaturity and boredom."17 9
Roorda v. Roorda, 25 Wash. App. 849, 611 P.2d 794 (1980), the court addressed the issue of the
standard that should be applied in determining whether "adequate cause" in accordance with the
statute had been demonstrated to authorize a hearing of the modification motion. The court ruled that
adequate cause "requires something more than prima facie allegations which, if proven, might permit
inferences sufficient to establish grounds for a custody change." Id. at 852, 611 P.2d at 796. See also
Nice-Peterson v. Nice-Peterson, 310 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981) (trial court should deny motion for
modification unless accompanying affidavits set forth sufficient justification, if facts alleged therein are
true, to justify modification).
77. In re Custody of Harne, 77 Ill. 2d 414, 420, 396 N.E.2d 499, 501 (1979). See also In re
Marriage of Baltierra, 87 Ill. App. 3d 592, 409 N.E.2d 378 (1980) (remanded for specific findings);
Schiele v. Sager, 174 Mont. 533, 571 P.2d 1142 (1977) (trial court erred by ignoring jurisdictional
prerequisites of UMDA); In re Custody of Dallenger, 173 Mont. 530, 568 P.2d 169 (1977) (same).
But see Georgia v. Georgia, 27 Ariz. App. 271, 553 P.2d 1256 (1976) (statute merely sets guidelines).
Recall that the Illinois legislature deleted this statutory requirement as of July 1, 1982. See supra pp.
775-76.
78. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980), since rescinded, permitted a change
in custody where the custodial parent agreed to the modification. Furthermore, § 610(b)(2) allowed
modification where "the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with the consent of
the custodian." See, e.g., In re Custody of Iverson, 83 Ill. App. 3d 493, 498, 404 N.E.2d 411, 415
(1980) (emotional dependency that five-year-old child developed for her older sister while residing for
more than a year with the noncustodial parent held sufficient to satisfy integration requirement of §
610(b)(2)); In re Custody of Burnett, 75 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1000, 394 N.E.2d 58, 60 (1979) (consent
requirement of § 610(b)(2) satisfied where custodial parent allowed his child to reside with family of
noncustodian and knowingly permitted the child to become integrated into new family).
79. Kraft v. Kraft, 108 I1. App. 3d 590, 597, 439 N.E.2d 491, 496 (1982) (quoting trial judge).
In another case, the court held:
The evidence of respondent's inability to devote sufficient time to the children and her lack of
concern for their well-being together with the evidence of the advantages to the children of
living with their father, support the trial court's conclusions, implicit in its ruling, that the
children's present environment endangers seriously their physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health and that the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its
advantages to them.
In re Marriage of Farris, 69 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1046, 338 N.E.2d 232, 235 (1979). See, e.g., Apple-
gate v. Applegate, 80 Il1. App. 3d 81, 399 N.E.2d 330 (1980); Russell v. Russell, 80 Ill. App. 3d 41,
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This liberal approach to an intentionally illiberal statute was not con-
fined to the Illinois trial courts, as the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Jarrett v. Jarrett illustrates.80 In that case, the court had awarded custody
to the wife at the time of the divorce in December 1976. Four months
later, she informed her ex-husband that a male friend of hers would begin
living with her and the children, with no present plan to marry. The
former husband promptly applied for a change of custody. In his support-
ing affidavit, he described a "living arrangement [that] was contrary to his
own personal beliefs." ' The trial court granted the petition as "necessary
for the moral and spiritual well-being and development" of the children.
2
The intermediate appeals court reversed, saying there was no evidence, as
required for a modification of custody, of neglect or negative effects.8 3
The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's custody modifi-
cation. The high court ruled that Ms. Jarrett's behavior was not only
deviant but criminal, and that it offended community morals and public
policy as expressed by the state legislature.8 4 According to the court, living
in an environment that openly flouted state criminal law posed danger to
the children's development because "it could well encourage children to
engage in similar activity in the future. 8s 5 In so holding, the supreme
court stated that the courts could act under the Illinois statute even with-
out "tangible manifestation of damage to [the children's] character."8 6
399 N.E.2d 212 (1979); De Franco v. De Franco, 67 Ill. App. 3d 760, 384 N.E.2d 997 (1978).
80. 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980).
81. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 I1. App. 3d 932, 934, 382 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1978), rev'd, 78 Ill. 2d 337,
400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980).
82. Id. at 935, 382 N.E.2d at 14.
83. Id. at 937, 382 N.E.2d at 16-17.
84. 78 Il. 2d at 345-48, 400 N.E.2d at 423-25.
85. Id. at 346-47, 400 N.E.2d at 424.
86. Id. at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 425. Jarrett has been both praised and criticized for the court's
willingness to "protect" a child's "moral development" prior to tangible evidence of damage to her.
Compare Note, Modification of Child Custody Predicated on Cohabitation of the Custodial Parent:
Jarrett v. Jarrett, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 169, 174-77, 179-81 (court acted properly to protect children
from moral injury their mother's cohabitation would inflict on them) with Note, Child Custody: Pa-
rental Cohabitational Relationships and the Best Interest of the Child Standard: Jarrett v. Jarrett,
29 DE PAUL L. REV. 1141 (1980) (court infringed on rights of both child and parent in custody
disputes). See also Bell v. Bell, 154 Ga. App. 290, 292, 267 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1980) (cohabitation
sufficient in and of itself to justify change of custody); Thompson v. Thompson, 96 Il1. 2d 67, 78, 449
N.E.2d 88, 93 (Jarrett did not establish conclusive presumption that cohabitation of custodial parent
harms child), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 242 (1983); In re Marriage of MeKeever, 117 I1. App. 3d 905,
910, 453 N.E.2d 1153, 1157 (1983) (Jarrett not controlling where cohabitation not open and notori-
ous); In re Marriage of Padiak, 101 Ill. App. 3d 306, 313-14, 427 N.E.2d 1372, 1377-78 (1981)
(statute contemplates modification of custody on basis of potential as well as actual harm to child); In
re Marriage of Olson, 98 Ill. App. 3d 316, 319, 424 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1981) (underJarrett, trial
court should look to moral values custodial parent actually demonstrates to children); Willcutts v.
Willcutts, 88 Il. App. 3d 813, 817, 410 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 (1980) (Jarrett does not mandate change
in custody where cohabitation is occasional rather than open and continuous); Hill v. Hill, 228 Kan.
680, 690-91, 620 P.2d 1114, 1122 (1980) (fact of cohabitation sufficient to support change in custody;
proof of harm to child not required); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (citing
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This judicial willingness to construe the UMDA liberally in favor of
modification applications raises several important questions. Is any at-
tempt, legislative or otherwise, to restrict judicial activism in this area
doomed to failure? Is there some institutional imperative that makes inevi-
table the courts' exercise of substantial discretion in this field? Is it impos-
sible to expect a judge to abide by a cold statutory mandate and to set
aside his or her personal views on what should become of the child in the
peculiar circumstances presented? Is it possible to draft a rule that strikes
a proper balance between the long-term policy considerations behind the
UMDA and the immediate need to protect vulnerable innocents? Finally,
and perhaps most critically, is it possible to persuade judges that they do
not necessarily know what is best, either in the long-term or in the short-
term, for the children involved?
D. Analysis and Evaluation of the Current Standards
Each of the approaches to modification applications described above
represents an attempt to balance competing policy interests. Trying to bal-
ance the policies behind the res judicata doctrine on the one hand, and the
policies in favor of making the best-advised contemporary determination
of the child's welfare on the other, the traditional changed circumstances
doctrine holds that not just any changed circumstances, but only substan-
tial ones, should warrant changing custody. The prior unknown facts ex-
ception to the traditional rule supposedly allows for just results in situa-
tions in which, under the usual approach, children might be left in
harmful situations.
Despite its apparent rationality, the changed circumstances standard
has been rejected by some courts and legislatures on the ground that the
interests of the children far outweigh the policies behind the res judicata
doctrine, and that therefore a pure best interests standard is preferable.
Criticism of the traditional standard has also come from the opposite pole,
with the assertion that there is no inconsistency between res judicata poli-
cies and an individual child's best interests; children are more likely to
fare best when left with their current custodian.
In the context of the initial custody decision, the best interests test has
of course occupied the field. At present, almost every jurisdiction uses
some formulation of the best interests standard to decide initial custody
disputes.8 7 The use of that standard in that context has been criticized as
resulting in an indeterminacy perhaps unparalleled in any other area of
Jarrett in support of decision to change custody because homosexual cohabitation violates social mo-
res); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394-95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (citingJarrett in support of
decision to change custody because homosexual cohabitation threatens child's development).
87. For a history of the development of the standard, see Foster & Freed, Life With Father:
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the law. Numerous commentators have bemoaned the unpredictability of
the best interests standard, but none has suggested a better approach to
the initial settlement of custody disputes."8 After an extensive review and
analysis, Professor Mnookin concluded that no other alternative offered
"assurance of being plainly superior to adjudication under the indetermi-
nate best-interests principle."' 9
Resigned acceptance of the best interests standard for initial custody
determinations may be a by-product of the recognition that in the matter
of custody determinations, there is almost always more than one accept-
able solution to any set of facts. The child will most likely develop within
the parameters of normalcy no matter which decision is made. In almost
all cases-certainly in the classic "hard" cases, where two caring parents
square off against one another-the issue is one of value choices. For ex-
ample, is the child best served by a warm, affectionate parent who has
difficulty setting limits and is inconsistent, or by a parent who is more
consistent but is demonstrably less affectionate? Is the child best served by
a non-working parent who may encounter problems simply because he or
she spends so much time with the child, or by a parent who works but
whose time with the child will, it is hoped, be "quality time"? The nature
of this inquiry-for this particular child, which parent will be better in
the future-makes it unlikely that the choice of one parent over the other
will result in serious detriment to the child.
While the best interests standard may be the "least worst" standard for
1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321 (1978); Mnookin, supra note 2, at 233-37; Roth, The Tender Years Pre-
sumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423 (1977); Sayre, Awarding Custody of Chil-
dren, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 672 (1942). A majority of the states provide by statute for a best interests of
the child standard. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a) (1983); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 157
(West Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1984-85); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 458:16 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1976); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1977-84); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 92 (Purdon
1965); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-828 (1977). Some statutes identify factors to be considered in making
the best interests determination. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
25-332 (Supp. 1984-85); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124
(1973 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 722 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (Harrison 1984); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-9-1 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (Smith-
Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21 (Burns 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270
(1984); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1984-85); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (West
Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-09-06.2 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 30-27-19
(1984); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10
(Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.190 (Supp. 1984-85); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-113
(1977).
88. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 2; Mnookin, supra note 2;
Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM. L. 21 (1965).
89. Mnookin, supra note 2, at 292.
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initial custody proceedings, the same approach is not necessarily the "least
worst" standard for custody modification proceedings. This is particularly
true with respect to cases involving custody awards that were the product
of initial agreement between the divorcing spouses-as most such awards
are today. 90
Modification decisions in cases involving consensual initial awards often
reflect a judicial view that judges, because they are not emotionally in-
volved in the dispute, can better assess what is best for the children. It has
never been proven, however, that emotionally uninvolved decisions con-
cerning child custody are superior to emotionally involved ones. To the
contrary, most commentators who have addressed the issue have concluded
that parents, not courts, are better equipped to make child custody deci-
sions. 1 Moreover, if custodial decisions based on parental agreement can
readily be opened, then the value of agreeing in the first place is dimin-
ished, and the litigation of initial disputes will be encouraged.92
If the discretionary best interests approach is flawed, the traditional
changed circumstances standard is not much better. Change of circum-
stance decisions uncannily resemble those decided under the best interests
standard, for it is not necessary to prove any extraordinary new circum-
stance; rather, a variety of factors may be considered.
Recall the hypothetical Smith family. Even if the court were to find
that the Smiths' children related well to both parents and were happy and
well-adjusted in their mother's custody, the court could find also that
there was a substantial difference in the parents' lifestyles and values. The
court could then conclude that the father could provide the children with a
better physical, moral, spiritual, social, and educational environment and
on that ground award custody to the father. In cases such as that of the
Smiths, courts find the required changed circumstances in such factors as
developments in the custodial parent's social life, work, home conditions,
or in the noncustodial parent's financial security and remarriage.93 The
90. See Kirshner, Child Custody Determination-A Better Way! 17 J. FAM. L. 275, 286
(1978-79); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950, 955 n.23 (1979); Watson, supra note 2, at 57.
91. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 506; Mnookin, supra note 2, at 288; Trombetta,
Joint Custody: Recent Research and Overloaded Courtrooms Inspire New Solutions to Custody Dis-
putes, 19 J. FAM. L. 213, 227 (1980-81).
92. There is also an increasing awareness of the potential role of mediation at the time of divorce.
Mediated agreements may provide a more satisfying and less acrimonious means to decide controver-
sies. In addition, this process is one method of stemming the tide of family litigation. Certainly, public
policy should not encourage divorcing couples to mediate their custody disputes and then give their
consensual decision short shrift when one party seeks to modify it. Any standard that gives less weight
to parental agreements than to judicial awards of custody is justified only if, in fact, judicial awards
are demonstrably "better."
93. Some of the factors courts have recognized as constituting the required change in circum-
stances are mother's employment, see, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 223 Kan. 639, 644, 576 P.2d 589,
593 (1978); Hansen v. Hansen, 327 N.W.2d 47, 48 (S.D. 1982), mother's part-time attendance at
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courts appear to be defining changed circumstances as a change in any
circumstance pertinent to the best interests of the child, so that the two
standards merge de facto.
The UMDA standard has not been immune from this tendency to
merge with the best interests standard. Some courts have found "serious
endangerment" under circumstances similar to those in the Smith hypo-
thetical.94 Furthermore, the UMDA's two-year waiting period provision
does little to insure the "finality" of the custody decree even for the first
twenty-four months of the decree's life.
In sum, it is not only private choices but the law itself that makes the
shape of the family after divorce so uncertain. The applicable legal stan-
dards are so flexible that divorced parents, long after their divorce, can
wage battle after battle over the custody of their children, and children
can be moved from one home to another and back again based on subjec-
tive factors which would not carry much weight, if any, in other types of
lawsuits.
E. A New Standard for Custody Modification
Children of divorce, and their families, need a new, more restrictive
standard for custody modification. No custodial modification should be al-
lowed (aside from consensual decisions to alter custodial arrangements)
unless the child is seriously endangered. The definition of endangerment
should be as specific as possible, focusing on whether the custodial parent
is taking prudent care of the child, not on whether the child's best inter-
ests are somehow being maximized. This new test would not differ sub-
stantially from model statutes that define when the state may, due to pa-
rental neglect, intervene in family decisionmaking and assume
responsibility for a child.9"
night school, see, e.g., Lightfoot v. Bylsma, 412 So. 2d 813, 814 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982), mother's
cohabitation, see, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 154 Ga. App. 290, 292, 267 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1980), mother's
sexual activity, see, e.g., Trunik v. Trunik, 179 Conn. 287, 288, 426 A.2d 274, 275 (1979); In re
Marriage of Goddard, 57 Or. App. 390, 644 P.2d 651, 653 (1982), father's remarriage, see, e.g.,
Walker v. Walker, 262 Ark. 648, 655, 559 S.W.2d 716, 720 (1978); Trunik v. Trunik, 179 Conn.
287, 288, 426 A.2d 274, 275 (1979), father's superior financial situation, see, e.g., Hansen v. Hansen,
327 N.W.2d 47, 48 (S.D. 1982); Walker v. Walker, 262 Ark. 648, 655, 559 S.W.2d 716, 720 (1978),
mother's failure to discipline child adequately, see, e.g., Lagrone v. Lagrone, 311 So. 2d 290, 291 (La.
App. 1975), and increased age of child, see, e.g., King v. King, 114 R.I. 329, 331, 333 A.2d 135, 137
(1975).
Reliance solely on racial prejudice in changing custody is constitutionally prohibited. In Palmore v.
Sidoti, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882 (1984), the United States Supreme Court ruled that concern for commu-
nity prejudice against the interracial marriage of the custodial mother is an impermissible factor in
deciding whether to remove her child from her custody.
94. See supra pp. 777-78.
95. For example, the statute recommended by the Institute of Judicial Administration-American
Bar Association Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards provides for such intervention if:
A. a child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that a child will imminently suffer, a
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The new standard for custody modification would also provide that
even when there is evidence of endangerment, modification is authorized
but not required. In any modification proceeding, the petitioner would
also have to prove that the benefits of any change outweigh the harm
likely to be caused by a change in environment.
Moreover, the new standard should provide express protection against
the modification of custody of children under three years of age.96 A heavy
statutory presumption that such a change itself would endanger the child
would accomplish this goal. In addition to proving the benefits of the pro-
posed change, any petitioner seeking to modify the custody of a child of
such tender years would also bear the burden of rebutting the statutory
presumption.
This new standard would retain the UMDA's procedural requirement
that petitioners make an initial showing on papers for all applications
within the first two years following a decree. In so providing, it would
recognize that this requirement is no more than a procedural safeguard
designed to weed out frivolous custody litigation, and that it is the stan-
dard's substantive provisions that must be looked to if the standard is to
accomplish its purposes.
physical harm, inflicted nonaccidentally upon him/her by his/her parents, which causes, or
creates a substantial risk of causing, disfigurement, impairment of bodily functioning, or other
serious physical injury;
B. a child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will imminently suffer,
physical harm causing disfigurement, impairment of bodily functioning, or other serious physi-
cal injury as a result of conditions created by his/her parents or by the failure of the parents to
adequately supervise or protect him/her;
C. a child is suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, or
withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, and the child's parents are
not willing to provide treatment for him/her;
D. a child has been sexually abused by his/her parent, or a member of his/her household, or
by another person where the parent knew or should have known and failed to take appropriate
action (alternative: a child has been sexually abused by his/her parent or a member of his/her
household, and is seriously harmed physically or emotionally thereby);
E. a child is in need of medical treatment to cure, alleviate, or prevent him/her from suffer-
ing serious physical harm which may result in death, disfigurement, or substantial impairment
of bodily functions, and his/her parents are unwilling to provide or consent to the medical
treatment;
F. child is committing delinquent acts as a result of parental encouragement, guidance, or
approval.
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT § 2.1 (1981). J. GOLD-
STEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 2, at 37, argue for a final, unconditional child placement
decision in divorce matters. They also state that "the noncustodial parent should have no legally
enforceable right to visit the child, and the custodial parent should have the right to decide whether it
is desirable for the child to have such visits." Id. at 38.
96. Children under three years of age need particular safeguards against the instability resulting
from custody modification. See pp. 797-98.
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A stricter, clearer, more certain standard governing custody modifica-
tion is essential. Recent social science findings have underscored the im-
portance to those concerned in custody litigation of what the UMDA's
drafters called finality. Perhaps a better term is repose. For it is repose,
according to the social science data, that all the parties concerned truly
need after a divorce.
III. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA
The findings and informed conclusions of social scientists have played a
key role in the development of legal rules and policies concerning initial
custody disputes.9" There is no reason that social science data should be
any less valuable with regard to the modification issue. While such re-
search may be far from perfect, it at least provides better guidance than
the raw judicial intuition upon which we now rely so heavily in determin-
ing the effect of a changed circumstance on a child and what may be
"best" for a child in a given situation.
In 1969, two prominent authorities, writing about the legislative reform
of custodial adjudication, noted with concern that few empirical studies
dealt with the effects of divorce and that those that did concentrated pri-
marily on the consequences of divorce on parents rather than children.98
Although a number of pertinent variables still need to be studied, since
1970 there has been significant research done concerning the effects of
97. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848 (1983);
Seymour v. Seymour, 180 Conn. 705, 711-12, 433 A.2d 1005, 1008 (1980); Golden v. Golden, 95
Misc. 2d 447, 449, 408 N.Y.S.2d 202, 204 (1978); Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 648-49, 403
N.Y.S.2d 401, 406 (1978); Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980); In re Marriage of
Ellenwood, 20 Or. App. 486, 488 n.1, 491, 532 P.2d 259, 261 n.1, 262 (1975).
A number of authorities have also discussed the need to rely on social science findings. See, e.g., J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 2, at 53 (proposal that specific assumptions of
psychoanalytic child development theory be incorporated into a new child custody standard known as
"the least detrimental alternative"); Benedek, Child Custody Laws: Their Psychiatric Implications,
129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 326-28 (1972) (behavioral scientists should assist legal system in determin-
ing best interests of child); Levy, Child Custody Determination-A Proposed Psychiatric Methodol-
ogy and Its Resultant Case Typology, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 189 (1978); Levy, The Meaning of the
Child's Preference in Child Custody Determination, 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 221 (1980); Litwack,
Gerber & Fenster, The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J. FAms. L. 269
(1979-80); Shepherd, Solomon's Sword: Adjudication of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. RICH. L.
REV. 151, 178 (1974) ("Courts must draw on the knowledge and research of other disciplines such as
psychiatry, psychology, . . . sociology, social work . . . so that those fields may demonstrate the ex-
tent to which various characteristics of the child and the custodial claimants are significant in achiev-
ing the objective of a healthy parent-child relationship."); Watson, supra note 2, at 73-74.
Some commentators have expressed concern over the misuse and limitations of psychological knowl-
edge in this area. See, e.g., Bradbrook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the
Future Development of the Laws Goveriing the Settlement of Inter-Parental Child Custody Dis-
putes, 11 J. FAM. L. 557 (1972); Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?,
29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117 (1976).
98. Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort to Rely on
Social Science Data in Formulating Legal Policies, 4 LAW & Soc'y REv. 167, 179 (1969).
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divorce on children, and, in particular, concerning the process of divorce
and the variables that contribute to a healthy adjustment to that process.99
A. The Divorce Process
Recent social science research reveals that divorce is not a single stress-
ful event confined to a certain moment, the date of the legal formality, but
is instead a process that extends over time,' 00 beginning prior to the for-
mal divorce with a state of family dissolution and ending some time after
the divorce in some form of family reconstitution. In that process, the
people involved learn to adapt and cope with their changed situations. To
reach a new equilibrium, family members experiment along the way with
a variety of coping mechanisms, some successful and some unsuccessful.
Several noteworthy research projects have focused on the post-divorce
adjustment of children and their parents. Hetherington, Cox and Cox
conducted a two-year longitudinal study of 48 white, middle-class, di-
vorced families with preschool children and a carefully matched sample of
intact families. 1 ' The study examined responses to the crisis of divorce,
including new patterns of family organization, and analyzed how the
characteristics of family members and the differences in family structure
contributed to the family members' responses to the divorce. Data were
collected at intervals of two months, one year, and two years following the
legal divorce. 102
The similar demographic characteristics of the families involved limits
the significance of this study. It does, however, provide a thus far unique,
in-depth analysis of divorcing families and an intact family control group
over time.
99. See, e.g., J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5; Hetherington, Cox & Cox, The After-
math of Divorce, in MOTHER-CHILD, FATHER-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 149 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as The Aftermath of Divorce]; A. Stolberg & D. Kiluk, A Temporal Model of Divorce Adjustment
with Implications for Primary Prevention (1983) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
100. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 303; Ahrons, Redefining the Divorced Fam-
ily: A Conceptual Framework, 25 Soc. WORK 437, 437 (1980); Berman & Turk, Adaption to Di-
vorce: Problems and Coping Strategies, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 179, 180 (1981); Felner, Farber,
Ginter, Boike & Cowen, Family Stress & Organization Following Parental Divorce or Death, 4 J.
DIVORCE 67, 68, 74 (1980); Hetherington, supra note 1, at 851; Kurdek, An Integrative Perspective
on Children's Divorce Adjustment, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 856, 863 (1981).
101. The research methods included interviews with the parents, structured diary records by the
parents, laboratory and home observations of parent-child interactions, parental and teacher ratings of
the child's behavior, observations of the child in school, and measures of the child's sex role typing,
cognitive performance, and social development.
102. Hetherington, Family Interaction and the Social, Emotional, and Cognitive Development of
Children after Divorce, in THE FAMILY: SET rING PRIORITIES 71, 73 (1979); The Aftermath of Di-
vorce, supra note 99, at 150-51; Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Effects of Divorce on Parents and
Children, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233, 234-36 (M.
Lamb ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Effects of Divorce]; Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Play and Social
Interaction in Children Following Divorce, 35 J. Soc. IssuES 26, 26 (Fall 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Play and Social Interaction].
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The study showed that families experience severe stress and disorgani-
zation during the first year following a formal divorce. Indeed, during that
first year, family conflict escalates rather than declines.10 3 On almost
every measure of parental behavior, divorced parents during the first
twelve months after divorce were coping far less well than non-divorced
parents. Divorced parents made fewer maturity demands on their chil-
dren, were less consistent in their discipline, were less apt to reason with
their children, communicated less well, and were less affectionate."" The
authors described a cycle of negative parent-child interaction, with the
most notable effect on the mother-son relationship."0 5 Only after that first
year of heightened tension did an increased sense of well-being begin to
emerge. At the two year follow-up, the most debilitating effects of the
divorce on both parents and children had abated.' 6
The other major longitudinal study of divorce and children, conducted
by Wallerstein and Kelly, concerned the effectiveness of a divorce counsel-
ing service in Marin County, California; its subjects were families who
had sought such assistance.107 Consequently, the families involved in this
study not only had similar backgrounds but were also self-selected and
therefore perhaps were not representative of all divorcing families. The
study also lacked an intact family control group. Despite these method-
ological shortcomings, this research is evidently the only longitudinal
study to assess the effects of divorce on children of different ages, is rich in
qualitative data, and has been well-received by social scientists.' 08
The sample consisted of sixty divorced couples with 131 children who
were between three- and eighteen-years-old at the time of the marital sep-
aration. All family members were interviewed by a therapist during the
six-week divorce counseling session. Although a divorce need not have oc-
curred prior to this session, the parents had to have separated and legal
proceedings had to have begun. Family members were interviewed again
twelve to eighteen months later, and once again five years later.' 9 This
five-year perspective enabled the researchers to distinguish several stages
103. See Hetherington, supra note 102, at 75; Effects of Divorce, supra note 102, at 261-62; Play
and Social Interaction, supra note 102, at 45; The Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 99, at 161-75.
104. The Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 99, at 163; Effects of Divorce, supra note 102, at 252.
105. Hetherington, supra note 102, at 75; Effects of Divorce, supra note 102, at 252.
106. See Hetherington, supra note 102, at 75; The Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 99, at
157-75; Effects of Divorce, supra note 102, at 262, 285; Play and Social Interaction, supra note 102,
at 45.
107. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 7.
108. See Jenkins, Book Review, 26 Soc. WORK 256 (1981); Littlefield, Book Review, 16 Sm.
BOOKS & FILMS 248 (1981); Moles, Book Review, 62 Soc. CASEWORK 380 (1981); Musmann, Book
Review, 105 LTBR. J. 1172 (1980).
109. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 4-5. For particulars about the design of the
study and the population, see id. at 319-34.
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in the divorce process and to report on the experiences of the children and
the adults during each of these periods.
Like the subjects in the study by Hetherington, Cox and Cox, the chil-
dren in the Wallerstein and Kelly study took some time to adjust to their
new situation. For example, at the first follow-up, nearly half of the pre-
school group, over one-third of the 7- and 8-year olds, and half of the 9-
and 10-year olds, either still displayed the dysfunctional behaviors ob-
served in the initial interviews or were in even more deteriorated psycho-
logical conditions."1 '
Eighteen months after separation, the "average" mother and father
were still in transition, struggling with the process of adapting to a new
environment and status. Particularly for the woman, life had not yet stabi-
lized; close to half of the women were depressed to some considerable de-
gree."'1 A number of both men and women continued to rage at their
former partners, seemingly unaffected by the passage of time." 2 Substan-
tiating the findings of Hetherington and her associates, Wallerstein and
Kelly concluded that the stresses during the beginnings of a post-divorce
relationship with the child were extraordinary, contributing particularly
to a strain on the custodial parent's capacity to parent.' On the other
hand, at the second follow-up, almost five years after separation, most




Other researchers have corroborated and commented upon the impor-
tance of the time factor in parental adjustment to divorce. An intimate
relationship between two individuals is not easily severed. The intensity of
the emotional attachment, which may include aspects of concern and
friendship as well as anger, revenge, pain, guilt, and distrust, has been
found to diminish with time as an individual learns to separate his or her
identity from that of the former spouse.1 5 Moreover, the adjustment of
110. Kelly & Wallerstein, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Early
Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 20, 31 (1976); Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental
Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Later Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 256, 268-69
(1976); Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: The Experiences of the Preschool
Child, 14 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 600, 615 (1975).
111. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 154-55.
112. Id. at 156.
113. Id. at 108-09, 112.
114. Id. at 182, 189-94. At this point, the more pathological responses and developments were
likely to be caused by a chronic state of disorganization which was exacerbated rather than caused by
the divorce. Id. at 182. Moreover, other factors, such as remarriage, redivorce, illness, and job
changes, complicated any attempt to trace a direct causal relationship between the divorce and the
eventual outcome for parents and children. Id. at 181.
115. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON THE FAMILY, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY,
NEW TRENDS IN CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 101 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NEW
TRENDS]; L. HALEM, SEPARATED AND DIVORCED WOMEN 160, 200 (1982); Ahrons, supra note
100, at 437; Berman & Turk, supra note 100, at 180; Kohen, From Wife to Family Head: Transi-
tions in Self-identity, 44 PSYCHIATRY 230 (1981).
The Yale Law Journal
the children is linked to that of the custodial parent. One study found that
the children's post-divorce social adjustment greatly depended upon the
custodial parent's ability to achieve and maintain his or her own emo-
tional and social adjustment.11 6
It would seem, then, that custody controversies often represent the play-
ing out, for a significant period of time after the formal divorce, of chron-
ic, unresolved, and acrimonious marital problems.' 1 7 Many custody con-
troversies during the transitional period prior to recovery from the divorce
would seem to be no more than a reflection of the lack of adjustment to
the psychological trauma of divorce." 8
In light of these findings, courts should not be permitted to modify ini-
tial custody decisions simply because a custodial parent is having difficulty
coping with the fact of the divorce and the new family arrangement.
Those difficulties are to be expected and most likely will be worked out
over time. A re-ordering of custody would only interfere with that adjust-
ment process.
B. Factors Contributing to Children's Post-Divorce Adjustment
The initial research on the impact of divorce concentrated on such is-
sues as whether children from divorced families are more aggressive, in-
competent, or dependent than their peers from intact homes. More re-
cently, researchers have tried to identify the specific variables affecting the
impact of divorce on children. This change in the research focus results
from the recognition that the divorce process can be influenced by rela-
tionships and events during the period following the marital dissolution.
A number of studies have sought to identify factors affecting children's
116. Pett, Correlates of Children's Social Adjustment Following Divorce, J. DIVORCE, Summer
1982, at 25, 32-34. See also Kurdek, supra note 100, at 860 (expect children's adjustment to be
related, in part, to custodial parent's, but little empirical evidence); Kurdek & Berg, Correlates of
Children's Adjustment to Their Parents' Divorces, in CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 47, 50, 58 (L.
Kurdek ed. 1983) (limited evidence supports view that children's divorce adjustment is related, in
part, to that of custodial parent).
117. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 28-29; R. WEISS, GOING IT ALONE 137
(1979); Chiriboga & Cutler, Stress Responses Among Divorcing Men and Women, 1 J. DIVORCE 95
(1977); Nelson, Moderators of Women's and Children's Adjustment Following Parental Divorce, 4
J. DIVORCE 71, 80 (1981); A. Stolberg & D. Kiluk, supra note 99, at 7-8.
118. Sociologist Robert Weiss contends that two to four years are needed before individuals are
"fully themselves again," with the average recovery period nearer the four year mark. R. WEISS,
MARITAL SEPARATION 236 (1975). Hetherington, Cox & Cox found that most children can cope
with and adapt to the short term crisis of divorce within "a few years," Hetherington, supra note 1,
at 852, and that there was an almost total amelioration of divorce related problems after six years. See
Effects of Divorce, supra note 102, at 285. The period of adjustment for parents and children is,
therefore, probably longer than the two-year statutory period. Considering, however, that the two-
year period in the UMDA statute usually will date from the initial custody order in the divorce
decree and that the parties are likely to have separated sometime prior to that time and to have begun
the period of adjustment prior to the time of the formal divorce, the two year period is probably an
appropriate benchmark.
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adjustments to divorce. Those identified include parental or familial fac-
tors, such as the ability of the noncustodial parent to maintain a relation-
ship with the child; environmental factors, such as the source and stability
of family income; and individual factors, such as the age, sex, and emo-
tional predisposition of the child. Information about these factors is useful
both in understanding the divorce experience and in identifying means to
facilitate positive post-divorce adjustment. Several of these factors are par-
ticularly significant in analyzing custodial modification standards.
1. Interpersonal Relationships
It should come as no surprise that conflict between parents has been
identified as an important influence on the behavior and well-being of
children. There is, for example, considerable evidence that children living
in conflict-ridden two-parent families are more poorly adjusted than chil-
dren living in well-functioning single parent families.11 There is also evi-
dence that continued conflict between parents after a divorce hinders the
positive adjustment of children.
One factor examined in the Hetherington study was the impact of in-
terparental conflict on the social development of children in both divorced
and intact families. On the basis of interview ratings, the divorced and
married parents were divided into two groups depending on whether they
exhibited high or moderate to low levels of conflict with each other. This
resulted in four groups: high-conflict nuclear families, low-to-moderate
conflict nuclear families, high-conflict divorced families, and low-to-
moderate conflict divorced families. Using a variety of measures of chil-
dren's home and school behavior, the relationship between the children's
adjustment and each type of family group was examined. The authors
interpreted their results as indicating that, two years after divorce, the
high-conflict divorced group exhibited the most adjustment problems, fol-
lowed by the high-conflict nuclear, the low-conflict divorced, and the low-
conflict nuclear groups. The finding that the high-conflict nuclear group
had greater difficulties than the low-conflict divorced group suggests that
interparental conflict, rather than family structure, has the greater impact
119. See Hetherington, supra note 102, at 75; The Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 99, at 175;
Jacobson, The Impact of Marital Separation/Divorce on Children: I. Inter-parent Hostility and
Child Adjustment, 2 J. DIVORCE 3, 5 (1978); McCord, McCord & Thurber, Some Effects of Pater-
nal Absence on Male Children, 64 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 361, 367 (1962); Nye, Child
Adjustment in Broken and in Unhappy Unbroken Homes, 19 MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING 356, 361
(1957); Rutter, Parent-Child Separation: Psychological Effects on the Children, 12 J. CHILD PSY-
CHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY & APPLIED DISCIPLINES 233, 240, 255 (1971) (concluding that, while the
separation of a child from his or her parent did not have any consistently negative effects on the
child's adjustment, exposure to conflict between parents did).
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on the post-divorce adjustment of children.12 This conclusion supports the
findings of other researchers that low levels of interparental conflict and
hostility preceding and following a divorce correlate with diminished
adjustment problems in children's social, emotional, and cognitive
development. 2
The social science literature casts light on why post-divorce conflict en-
genders developmental difficulties. Separation of parents often creates con-
flicting demands for allegiance by one or both parents, which in turn in-
tensify a child's stress.1 22 This battle for loyalty raises anxiety and places
a premature burden of responsibility upon the child for the well-being of
120. Effects of Divorce, supra note 102, at 260-62. Hetherington, Cox and Cox have also found
that high levels of conflict vitiate the generally positive effect of frequent visitation by the noncustodial
parent. The Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 99, at 163. Studying a sample of sixteen divorced
families and sixteen intact families, all of whom had a child between the ages of nine and eleven
years, Hess and Camara analyzed a number of variables: whether the family was divorced or intact;
the affective relationship between the child and each parent and the level of harmony between the
parents; the degree of contact between the noncustodial father and the child; and certain behavioral
outcomes. Their results showed that negative child behavior was as closely related to parental har-
mony as it was to whether the child came from an intact or a divorced family. Hess & Camara, Post-
Divorce Family Relationships as Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorce for Children, J.
Soc. ISSUES, Fall, 1979, at 79, 87. See Rosen, Children of Divorce: What They Feel About and Other
Aspects of Divorce Experience, 6 J. OLIN. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 24, 24 (1977).
121. See, e.g., Berg & Kelly, The Measured Self-Esteem of Children from Broken, Rejected, and
Accepted Families, 2 J. DIVORCE 363, 367-68 (1979); Emery, Interpersonal Conflict and the Chil-
dren of Discord and Divorce, 92 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 310, 313 (1982); Hodges, Wechsler &
Ballantine, Divorce and the Preschool Child: Cumulative Stress, 3 J. DIVORCE 55, 62-63, 66 (1979);
Raschke & Raschke, Family Conflict and Children's Self Concepts: A Comparison of Intact and
Single-Parent Families, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 367, 367-68, 372-73 (1979). The other factors are
a minimal depletion of financial resources, low hostility and cooperative parenting between ex-
spouses, approval and love from both parents, authoritative discipline from the custodial parent, regu-
lar visitation by the noncustodial parent, and an emotional climate that helps children discuss divorce-
related concerns. See Kurdek & Berg, supra note 116, at 49-50.
Of course most children from divorced families are also exposed to some unknown pre-divorce
conflict, which may be a determinative factor. The data suggest, however, that the termination of that
conflict, as opposed to its continuation or exacerbation, is to the child's benefit. See Emery, supra, at
314; A. Stolberg, C. Camplair, K. Currier, & M. Wells, Individual, Familial and Environmental
Predictors of Children's Post-Divorce Adjustment and Maladjustment 13-14 (unpublished manuscript
on file with the author).
122. See, e.g., NEw TRENDS, supra note 115, at 67; A. MusEro, DILEMMAS IN CHILD CUS-
TODY: FAMILY CONFLICTS AND THEIR RESOLUTION 34-36 (1982); Hess & Camara, supra note
120, at 81-82. In one modification case brought by a father seeking custody, the child's guardian ad
litem reported that the child did not complain a great deal about wanting to live with her father, but
that she did wish to reduce the tensions between her parents. Gratrix v. Gratrix, 652 P.2d 76, 79
(Alaska 1982). Wallerstein and Kelly found that one of the central themes of the children's divorce
experience in their study was the feeling of conflicted loyalties:
Often the conflict is exacerbated by parents and, indeed, two-thirds of the parents openly
competed for the children's love and allegience. . . . School age children particularly appeared
to conceptualize the divorce as a struggle in which each participant demanded one's primary
loyalty, and this conception greatly increased the conflict and unhappiness of the child.
J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 49. Another commentator put it this way: "Children
at any developmental stage are subject to loyalty conflicts which in my opinion are the greatest dan-
gers they confront." A. MusErro, supra, at 55. One study that relied on parental reporting about
children's behavior had a surprising finding in this regard. Three quarters of the group who had
experienced fully contested custodial cases reported that the children had been no harder to handle
during this process. It may be that parents are unaware of or are rationalizing the effects of litigation,
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the adults upon whom the child depends. Although these demands may be
implicit in every divorce situation, they become explicit when there is cus-
tody litigation. This need to behave at such a mature level of interpersonal
sensitivity and awareness is often more than the child can handle at his or
her stage of development. High levels of parental discord may also keep
the child constantly distressed and confused, and make adjustment to the
reality of the new family situation difficult.123 Any post-divorce conflict,
then, will affect the child's development. A lengthy and bitter custody dis-
pute may further impair psychological development or spark regression to
less mature behavioral patterns.
12 4
Moreover, in light of the fact that many modification decisions are at
least partially based on the child's custodial preference,12 another finding
documented by Wallerstein and Kelly is most significant. In almost all
divorce situations, children desperately want their parents to be reunited
and are angry that they are apart. They generally express that anger to-
ward the parent who spends the most time looking after them. Wallerstein
and Kelly found that children turned against the parent who took the time
to care for the child-the person who often would be the more appropri-
ate custodial parent. This finding increased the researchers' misgivings
about relying on the expressed opinions and preferences of youngsters be-
low adolescence in deciding custodial issues.'26
What remains unanswered is whether post-divorce hostility, with its
deleterious effects on children, would decrease if custody modification liti-
gation were restricted. It is possible that some parents are able to conceal
their angry feelings, even while litigating the custody issue. It is also pos-
sible that such litigation provides a therapeutic outlet for parents, thus
permitting their day-to-day relationships with each other and with their
children to be less hostile. More likely, however, the relitigation of custody
signifies to the child just what it signifies to anyone else-that the parents
are in overt conflict with one another and that this conflict is sufficiently
strong to bring them to the courts. Therefore, the fact of the litigation
itself means that interparental hostility exists, together with its concomi-
tant adverse effects on the children.
127
or it may be that the effects of a custody contest are less deleterious than assumed. See Fulton, Paren-
tal Reports of Children's Post-Divorce Adjustment, J. Soc. Issus, Fall, 1979, at 126, 131-32.
123. Hess & Camara, supra note 120, at 83.
124. A. MusETro, supra note 122, at 41-42.
125. See Moskowitz, Divorce-Custody Dispositions: The Child's Wishes in Perspective, 18 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 427 (1978); Siegel and Hurley, The Role of The Child's Preference in Custody
Proceedings, 11 FAM. L. QUAR. 1 (1977); Speca, The Role of the Child in Selecting His or Her
Custodian in Divorce Cases, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 437 (1977-78).
126. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 314-15.
127. Researchers in one recent study asked an admittedly small sample of twenty-five single di-
vorced mothers, who had been separated an average of about six years, to evaluate the difficulty of
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If that is true, then it follows that modification disputes should be dis-
couraged. Again, there is the theoretical possibility that a standard that
met this goal would have adverse consequences for a child. Parents, frus-
trated by the inability to bring modification suits, might become even
more antagonistic to one another. On the other hand, stricter standards
that set clear boundaries for modification actions should encourage parents
to adjust more quickly to the reality of the post-divorce situation. Know-
ing that the courts are unable to help them, and that consensual changes
are the only solution to custodial disagreements, parents' hostility toward
each other may well decrease. In short, if the legal system provides no
battleground, it is less likely that there will be a battle.'
2. Remarriage
Recent estimates indicate that eighty percent of divorced men and
seventy-five percent of divorced women eventually remarry, usually within
three to five years after they divorce.' 29 Because approximately sixty per-
cent of divorced persons have children under eighteen years of age,' 30 it is
extremely likely today that a child who experiences divorce will also expe-
rience the remarriage of one or both parents. And it is not surprising that
noncustodial parents often support their petitions for modification by
pointing to their remarriage.'
3 '
Despite these statistics, there has been little research on the adjustment
of children in such post-divorce stepparent families. Most studies involv-
ing stepparent families have focused on comparisons of children who are
various aspects of their divorce. Kurdek & Blisk, Dimensions and Correlates of Mothers' Divorce
Experiences, J. DIVORCE, Summer 1983, at 1. Their findings indicate that single divorced mothers
continue to experience stress in the long term post-separation period, particularly when there is fre-
quent interaction with the ex-husband. This stress can be expected if the parents are engaged in post-
divorce custodial litigation. More importantly, the study also found that the mothers' post-separation
stress and interparental conflict during that period were related to their children's social and psycho-
logical maladjustment. Id. at 18-21. While other studies have found that contact with the ex-spouse
was an integral part of children's divorce adjustment, see, e.g., J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra
note 5, at 307-08, 310-11, Kurdek & Blisk found that such contact is beneficial only when it occurs
in the more general context of amicable inter-parent relations. Kurdek and Blisk, supra, at 22.
128. The contrary premise, that eliminating the legal forum will not affect the number of disputes
between squabbling ex-spouses, is, of course, also plausible. Rather than relying on intuitive responses
to such issues, we need empirical evidence to resolve them.
129. See Glick, Remarriage: Some Recent Changes and Variations, 1 J. FAM. ISSUES 455,
465-66 (1980) (median span between divorce after first marriage and remarriage was three years for
women aged 35-54, and five years for women aged 55-75 at time of the 1976 Bureau of the Census
report).
130. Glick, Children of Divorced Parents in Demographic Perspective, J. Soc. IssuEs, Fall,
1979, at 170, 174. It is estimated that by 1990, 15 to 20% of all children under the age of 18 will be
living with a stepparent. Glick, supra note 129, at 468.
131. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 223 Kan. 639, 576 P.2d 589 (1978); Gulyas v. Gulyas, 75
Mich. App. 138, 254 N.W.2d 818 (1977); Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d
765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982).
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living (or adults who have lived) in stepfamilies, nuclear families, and/or
single parent families, using broad measures of psychosocial adjustment or
cognitive functioning. 32 While the evidence is not overwhelming, it does
suggest that remarriage inflicts some degree of trauma on children. For
example, Bowerman and Irish concluded that of the children in their sam-
ple, the 2,145 living in households of remarriage experienced "greater
levels of uncertainty of feelings, insecurity of position and strain" than did
the children from intact families.1 3 Studies have also found that
stepparent-stepchild relationships are more problematic with older chil-
dren and adolescents than with younger children, and that in general step-
parent relationships with their stepchildren become more positive as the
families' socioeconomic status increases."3 Although the data reveal that
the entry of a stepfather into a father-absent home has a positive effect on
boys' cognitive and personality development, 3 5 there are some findings
132. See, e.g., Bowerman & Irish, Some Relationships of Stepchildren to Their Parents, 24
MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING 113, 115 (1962); Burchinal, Characteristics of Adolescents from Unbro-
ken, Broken and Reconstituted Families, 26 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 44, 46-47 (1964); Chapman,
Father Absence, Stepfathers, and the Cognitive Performance of College Students, 48 CHILD DEV.
1155, 1155 (1977); Oshman & Manosevitz, Father Absence: Effects of Stepfathers Upon Psychosocial
Development in Males, 12 DEF. PSYCHOLOGY 479, 479 (1976); Perry & Pfuhl, Adjustment of Chil-
dren in "Solo" and "Remarriage" Homes, 25 MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING 221, 222-23 (1963); Pett,
supra note 116, at 35; Santrock, Relation of Type and Onset of Father Absence to Cognitive Develop-
ment, 43 CHILD DEv. 455, 467-68 (1972).
Two large-scale studies reported the mental health consequences for children living in a remarried
family to be worse than those for children living in a family broken by divorce or death without
remarriage. All three situations were worse than living in an intact family. T. LANGNER & S.
MICHAEL, LIFE STRESS AND MENTAL HEALTH 158-61 (1963); M. ROSENBERG, SOCIETY AND THE
ADOLESCENT SELF-IMAGE 85, 98-99 (1965). Another study, which used data from two large national
surveys to analyze the differences between respondents who had lived in unbroken families and re-
spondents who had experienced stepfather families, found essentially no differences between the
groups on a large number of variables. Wilson, Zurcher, McAdams & Curtis, Stepfathers and
Stepchildren: An Exploratory Analysis from Two National Surveys, 37 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 526,
530, 534-35 (1975). The researchers concluded that "[t]he child who is part of a stepfather family
may have a predominatley [sic] positive, predominatley [sic] negative, or mixed experience in that
family." Id. at 535.
133. Bowerman & Irish, supra note 132, at 120.
134. See J. BERNARD, REMARRIAGE: A STUDY OF MARRIAGE 216 (1956) (consensus among
remarried parents is that adolescents have more difficulty assimilating a new parent than do children
who are very young or quite grown up); L. DUBERMAN, THE RECONSTITUTED FAMILY: A STUDY
OF REMARRIED COUPLES AND THEIR CHILDREN 57-58, 105 (1975); T. LANGNER & S. MICHAEL,
supra note 132, at 173-74; Duberman, Step-Kin Relationships, 35 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 283, 288,
290 (1973).
135. Chapman, supra note 132, at 1157; Oshman & Manosevitz, supra note 132, at 480; San-
trock, supra note 132, at 467. A recent study by Professor Santrock and his associates at the Univer-
sity of Texas supports this finding. Santrock, Warshak, Lindbergh & Meadows, Children's & Par-
ent's Observed Social Behavior in Stepfather Families, 53 CHILD. DEV. 472, 472 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Stepfather Families]. Despite its small sample, it eliminated some of the methodological flaws
of other studies. This study of the effects of the custodial parents' remarriage on children's social
behavior compared three groups, each consisting of twelve children matched for age, sex, family size,
and socioeconomic status. Those from the first group were from divorced homes in which the custodial
mothers had remarried; those from the second group were from divorced homes in which there was no
remarriage; and those from the third group were from intact homes. The children were observed
while interacting with their parents.
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that friction is likely to develop between a girl and her remarried mother
and that girls whose custodial mothers remarry are, as a group, particu-
larly at risk.1"6 There is also some limited evidence that stepfathers have
better relationships with their stepchildren than do stepmothers. 3
Most of this research is plagued with methodological problems, includ-
ing the use of nonrandom, unrepresentative, or clinical samples; the com-
bining of stepmother and stepfather families into one category; the reli-
ance on surveys and questionnaires given to one family member only; the
absence of any direct behavioral measures of stepparent-stepchild interac-
tiong or assessments of adjustment by others, such as teachers; and the
failure to include nuclear family control groups. Despite these difficulties
and the dearth of any longitudinal studies that follow ex-spouses into re-
marriage or specifically compare structurally different kinds of stepfami-
lies, including those that were formed after the death of a spouse as op-
posed to after a divorce, there is a consensus in the literature that the
psychological damage done to a child by divorce is not necessarily replaced
or ameliorated through remarriage of one of the parents.13
136. Thies, Beyond Divorce: The Impact of Remarriage on Children, 6 J. CLIN. CHILD PSY-
CHOLOGY 59-60 (1977) (citing Kalter, Children of Divorce in an Outpatient Psychiatric Population,
47 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 40, 47 (1977)). Two researchers have predicted that single-parent
custody arrangements function more smoothly when the child is of the same sex as the custodial
parent. Santrock & Warshak, Father Custody and Social Development in Boys and Girls, J. Soc.
IssuEs, Fall, 1979, at 112, 119. The addition of a stepfather may disrupt the relationship between
mother and daughter. Stepfather Families, supra note 135, at 479. For a boy, the advantage of having
a same sex parental model may outweigh the disadvantage of having to share his mother with a
stepfather.
137. L. DUBERMAN, supra note 134, at 64; Duberman, supra note 134, at 290. In Wallerstein
and Kelly's study, the presence of a stepfather did not have the expected result of reducing contact
with the biological father. Geographic relocation caused by the remarriage did limit visiting, but the
pattern of visiting seemed more affected by the remarriage of the noncustodial father. J. WALLER-
STEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 292.
138. See, e.g., Jones, Divorce and Remarriage: A New Beginning, A New Set of Problems, 2 J.
DIVORCE 217, 223-25 (1978); Thies, supra note 136, at 61; Walker, Rogers & Messinger, Remar-
riage After Divorce: A Review, 58 Soc. CASEWORK 276, 277, 283 (1977). Because the assimilation of
divorce-related changes may take several years, see supra pp. 780-86, and the average duration be-
tween divorce and remarriage is three years, children are probably still engaged in problems associ-
ated with the divorce process when they are faced with the additional structural and relationship
changes brought about by the remarried family.
Adults' unresolved personal and divorce conflicts in a remarriage may become focused on the child.
Thies, supra note 136, at 60; Cf Fast & Cain, The Stepparent Role: Potential for Disturbances in
Family Functioning, 36 AM J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 485, 487-88 (1966) (tendency of parent and
stepparent to focus on child as source of all marital dissension and as threat to the marriage itself).
One Canadian study based on questionnaire responses from 200 remarried couples and later follow-
up interviews with 70 of the couples found that the "couples felt poorly prepared for the problems
they faced in trying to integrate the new household formed when divorced persons with children from
a previous marriage remarry." Messinger & Walker, supra note 5, at 430. Potential problems of
children's adjustment to remarriage may be even more complex in a home with two sets of children.
Jones, supra, at 224. Each child's feelings of territoriality and position in the age hierarchy may be
disrupted. Those children moving in may consider themselves or be perceived as the interlopers,
whereas those already there may consider themselves or be perceived as the invaded. Walker, Rogers
& Messinger, supra, at 283.
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Because of the paucity of relevant research, any conclusions must be
tentative. There seems to be no support, however, for the generalized judi-
cial assumption that when one parent remarries, the new spouse will re-
place the lost parent, thereby creating a desirable, stable nuclear family.
Quite to the contrary, stepparent relationships may cause new and addi-
tional difficulties for the children of divorced parents. It is therefore ironic
that courts rely so heavily on remarriage as a ground for modifying cus-
tody decisions.
The remarriage issue is but one example of the potential abuse under
amorphous changed circumstances or best interests standards. The flexi-
bility which some see as the virtue of those standards in modification cases
is thought desirable in order to permit courts to change custody in the
event of a development such as the noncustodial parent's remarriage.
Courts operating under such malleable substantive rules are able to use
assumptions unsupported by empirical evidence to effect changes that,
upon closer analysis, make no sense and would be impermissible under a
more exacting standard.
3. Residential Changes
The extent of environmental change that parents and children experi-
ence after divorce is another factor related to children's adjustment. These
changes include new economic and occupational circumstances facing the
custodial parent, changes in the amount of physical and emotional availa-
bility each parent has for the child, as well as changes in the parents'
relationship. Among these changes, often resulting from the economic re-
structuring of the family, is a change of residence.' 39 In addition to a new
physical environment, a change of residence may also place the child in a
new school with altered academic expectations, disrupt existing social re-
lationships, and force the child to establish different ones.
In our mobile society many individuals change their place of residence
each year.1 40 Social scientists have explored the impact of these moves. 14'
139. See, e.g., D. LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY: A STUDY OF FAMILIES AFTER DIVORCE 63
(1982) (in research sample, 81% of fathers with custody able to stay in house they had been living in
during marriage; half of mothers with custody had to move); Fulton, supra note 122, at 132 (in
research sample, 47% of mothers with custody had not moved since the time of the divorce, but the
other 53% had moved an average of two times, and some had moved eight times).
140. Over thirty-seven million Americans, approximately 17% of the population, move each year.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Geographic Mobility: March 1981 to March 1982, in CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, SERIES P-20, No. 384, at 1 (1984); see
also E. KAHN, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 75 (1974) (reporting similar figures).
141. See, e.g., Leff, Roatch & Bunney, Environmental Factors Preceding the Onset of Severe
Depressions, 33 PSYCHIATRY 293, 298, 302 (1970); Olive, Kelsey, Visser & Daly, Moving as Per-
ceived by Executives and Their Families, 18 J. OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 546 (1976).
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Their studies have demonstrated that individuals vary greatly in their re-
sponses to geographical relocation, and that there is probably an optimum
level of mobility for each person. 4 ' Various authorities who are primarily
interested in the effects on children have concluded that moving can be
detrimental in terms of adjustment.'" Others, however, have suggested
that moving is not itself detrimental to children, but that certain circum-
stances make some children more vulnerable to the stressful effects of
moving.'*
One of the circumstances that appears to influence the effect of a move
on a child is whether the child is a member of a divorced or an intact
family. When a change in residence is combined with a divorce, harm is
more likely to result. To a child from an intact home, moving may be
associated with improved family conditions, such as moving to a larger
home or a parent's obtaining a better job. On the other hand, to a child
from a divorced home, moving is likely to indicate decreased family stabil-
ity, including lowered income and moving to a less desirable neighbor-
hood.' 45 Moreover, even if an intact family's move is related to such nega-
tive factors, the children may be more capable of withstanding such
familial strains because of the support of a stable family.
The stress that post-divorce mobility places upon children has not been
thoroughly documented or described in the divorce literature. Some re-
searchers have concluded that environmental instability is one of the fac-
tors that affects the psychopathology of children in the post-divorce pe-
riod.'4 Stolberg and Anker, for example, have provided direct evidence
that children's divorce-related difficulties, including depression, social
withdrawal, and aggression, may stem from their perception that they
142. See Van Dongen, Relationships Between Attitudes Toward Family Change of Residence
and Children's Postmove Adjustment, 3 ISSUES MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 51, 53 (1981). Re-
sponse to change may be in the direction of unfolding capacities, development, and increased capacity
for independence or may be in the direction of slowing down, losing capacities, or regression. Solnit,
Change and the Sense of Time, in CHILDREN AND THEIR PARENTS IN A CHANGING WORLD: VOL-
UME V. THE CHILD IN HIS FAMILY 21, 22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as THE CHILD IN His FAMILY].
143. See, e.g., Levine, Residential Change and School Adjustment, 2 COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH J. 61, 62 (1966).
144. See, e.g., Anthony, Theories of Change and Children at High Risk for Change, in THE
CHILD IN HIS FAMILY, supra note 142, at 283, 286-88; Kantor, Some Consequences of Residential
and Social Mobility for the Adjustment of Children, in MOBILITY AND MENTAL HEALTH 86,
111-13 (M. Kantor ed. 1965); Pedersen & Sullivan, Relationships Among Geographical Mobility,
Parental Attitudes and Emotional Disturbances in Children, 34 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 575,
578-580 (1964) (parental attitudes to mobility mediate stressful effects of mobility); Tooley, The Role
of Geographic Mobility in Some Adjustment Problems of Children and Families, 9 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD PSYCHIATRY 366, 368 (1970); Van Dongen, supra note 142, at 60.
145. See Stolberg & Anker, Cognitive and Behavioral Changes in Children Resulting from Pa-
rental Divorce and Consequent Environmental Changes, 7 J. DIVORCE 23, 32 (1983).
146. See Fulton, supra note 122, at 133.
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have minimal control over environmental changes such as a new
residence.14
If a child's post-divorce adjustment is related to environmental change,
then custody modification decisions and rules should reflect sensitivity to
the stresses related to these changes. Invariably, changing a child's custo-
dian will involve a change of residence. By decreasing the number of
moves for children, a stricter standard for custodial modification would
increase the likelihood of adjustment to divorce.
4. Post-divorce Sexual Relations of the Custodial Parent
As evidenced by the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Jarrett v. Jar-
rett, 48 a custody modification proceeding, while theoretically addressed to
the child's interests, often focuses on the custodian's sexual conduct.1 49 As
in Jarrett, a transfer of custody in such a case may be justified merely on
notions of public policy. Whether public policy alone suffices, or more
tangible evidence of harm is required, courts almost always refer to the
supposed modeling effect of parental behavior on children?1 0 In fact, there
is very little empirical data concerning the effect of the custodial parent's
post-divorce sexual behavior upon the child's adjustment.
Moreover, the existing research on this subject suggests that although
147. Their subjects were two groups of children, aged six to sixteen; one group was from divorced
homes and lived with a custodial mother, and the other was from intact families. There were no
significant differences between the two groups in sex of child, current age of child, or predivorce
annual per capita income. Various behavioral measures were given to the parents and children to
assess environmental and other life changes. Stolberg and Anker concluded that children "whose home
environments have changed substantially following parental divorce are likely to experience some sig-
nificant psychological problems." Stolberg & Anker, supra note 145, at 38. See also Hodges, Wechs-
ler & Ballantine, supra note 121, at 62 (the more moves in the preceding five years, the greater the
amount of aggression in preschool children from divorced families; this relationship did not hold true
for children from intact families). But see Kurdek & Berg, supra note 116, at 58. These researchers
found that children's divorce adjustment was unrelated to the degree of environmental change. They
concluded, nonetheless, that the middle class sample may not have had an impact on the children's
adjustment or that major adjustments may have already occurred. Id.
148. 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980).
149. See, e.g., Dunne v. Dunne, 211 Neb. 636, 643, 319 N.W.2d 741, 745 (1982) ("sexual mis-
conduct" is a factor in determining custody); Small v. Small, 412 So. 2d 283, 285 (Ala. Civ. App.
1982) (custody order modified upon evidence that mother had man "sleeping in her home"); Brandt v.
Brandt, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1107, 425 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (1981) (observing that mother's "living
arrangement. . . might. . . compound any problems of insecurity" in younger child); In re Custody
of Boyer, 83 Il1. App. 3d 52, 403 N.E.2d 796 (1980) (refusing to modify consent decree in part
because mother was no longer sharing home with a man); Paschall v. Paschall, 26 N.C. App. 491,
493, 216 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1975) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in transferring custody award
from mother whose adulterous relationship was contrary to "best interest of the child").
In a survey of 57 circuit judges and 23 commissioners in Kentucky, 91% reported that they consider
at least some types of sexual practices as evidence of deficient moral character. Eighty-three percent
reported that they use the same standards for both mother and father. Lowery, Child Custody Deci-
sions in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey of Judges, 12 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 492, 495-96 (1981).
150. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Padiak, 101 11. App. 3d 306, 312, 427 N.E.2d 1372, 1376-77
(1981); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 I1. 2d 337, 346-47, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424 (1978).
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the relationship of children, parents, and their lovers creates certain diffi-
culties during the post-divorce period, children generally achieve a more
satisfactory adjustment if the custodial parent has a satisfying adult sexual
relationship. Wallerstein and Kelly describe the custodial parent's difficul-
ties in developing a heterosexual relationship: If the custodial parent went
out too frequently, she risked the displeasure and jealousy of her children
or the allegations of an angry spouse that she was a "bad mother" who
was not interested in her children. On the other hand, bringing her
friends of the opposite sex home only increased the mother's risks and
feelings of guilt and anxiety.15'
Establishing such a relationship, however, significantly facilitates the
adult's adaptation to divorce. Hetherington, Cox and Cox state that "the
most important factor in changing the self-concept two years after divorce
was the establishment of a satisfying, intimate, heterosexual relation-
ship."'1 52 There is also evidence that the child's adjustment is linked to
that of the custodial parent,'15 and that, in particular, children are better
adjusted if the parent is dating or seriously considering marriage.'54
Even where courts receive "objective" evidence of "inappropriate" be-
havior by a custodial parent, it may be better for the child's development
to continue the ongoing custodial relationship, unless the child's safety is
at risk, in order for the child to work through any ambivalence toward
that parent.' 5 According to this view, the court should not, by changing
custody, confirm in the child's eyes the moral condemnation of one parent
by the other. In the long run, the "inadequate parenting" caused by such
"inapproriate behavior" is less dangerous to the child than the loss of trust
such condemnation engenders.'
56
The changed circumstances and best interests standards are not in
themselves inconsistent with an enlightened view of this issue. Those
amorphous standards, however, provide little safeguard against decisions
so prevalently based on other, personal views. Both the courts and the
parents need clearer guidance.
5. Attachment and Separation
Over twenty-five years ago, John Bowlby began his work on the effect
upon a child's development of the child's attachment to another person.
151. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 5, at 34.
152. The Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 99, at 159.
153. See supra p. 787.
154. Pett, supra note 116, at 37.
155. NEw TRENDS, supra note 115, at 91.
156. Id. at 146-47.
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His work, Attachment and Loss, remains the major statement of attach-
ment theory.157 Attachment, according to Bowlby, consists of "any form of
behavior that results in a person attaining or retaining proximity to some
other differentiated and preferred individual, usually conceived as stronger
and/or wiser. As such [it] includes following, clinging, crying, calling,
greeting, smiling, and other more sophisticated forms [of behavior].""' 8
When a person is anxious, fatigued, or sick, attachment behavior is
most obvious and can be alleviated by comforting and caregiving. At other
times, although the behavior is less evident, the mere knowledge that the
attachment figure is available and responsive provides a strong and perva-
sive sense of security. 59 The principal attachment figure is that person
who is most responsive to the child's signals of biological needs and who
initiates and maintains social interactions with the child.' 60 An infant usu-
ally develops concern with maintaining proximity to an attachment figure
around the age of six to twelve months. 6' Although it does not disappear,
by the end of the preschool years this concern does become "somewhat
attenuated."'
62
Despite Bowlby's argument that there is a bias for a child to attach
himself especially to one figure, a characteristic he has called monotrophy,
a growing body of evidence now suggests that there is great individual
variation in the strength and distribution of attachments, that the main
bond is not always with the mother, and that bonds are often multiple.
For example, if both parents work, or grandparents care for a child a
157. J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss: VOLUME I, ATTACHMENT (1969); J. BOWLBY, AT-
TACHMENT AND Loss: VOLUME II, SEPARATION (1973); J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss:
VOLUME III, Loss (1980).
158. Bowlby, Attachment Theory, Separation Anxiety, and Mourning, in 6 AMERICAN HAND-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY: NEW PSYCHIATRIC FRONTIERS 292, 292, (D. Hamburg & H. Brodie, 2d ed.
1975).
159. Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Retrospect and Prospect, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
664, 668-69 (1982).
160. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's concept of the psychological parent is also essentially con-
cerned with attachment:
This attachment results from day-to-day attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment,
comfort, affection, and stimulation. Only a parent who provides for these needs will build a
psychological relationship to the child on the basis of the biological one and will become his
"psychological parent" in whose care the child can feel valued and "wanted."
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 2, at 17.
161. M. RUTrrrER, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION REASSESSED 139 (1981). By this stage of develop-
ment, the child has attained sufficient mental resources to maintain a positive mental representation of
the nurturing parent as a living object that both provides love and becomes the object of the child's
love and expectations. Solnit, supra note 142, at 21, 31.
162. Ainsworth, Attachment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE PLACE OF ATTACHMENT IN
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3, 11 (C. Parkes & J. Stevenson-Hinde eds. 1982).
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good deal of the time, there may be an intricate pattern of multiple attach-
ment relationships.' 63 Nevertheless, there is some evidence that there is a
hierarchy of attachment figures, with some stronger than others.'64
Both an initial failure to develop such attachment bonds and separation
from established attachment figures have been empirically linked to acute
distress, conduct disorders, developmental and intellectual retardation, and
the inability to form meaningful social relationships.16 5 The factual pat-
terns which have been the subject of such attachment studies, however, are
not particularly relevant to the issue at hand. The custody modification
situation is unlike, for example, hospitalization or foster care, where the
child is separated for a period of time from attachment figures, and these
situations involve different environmental stresses for a child. Nor is it
relevant here to evaluate the strength or quality of attachment to each
parent in order to make an initial custody decision.' Instead, changes in
custody create a pattern of separation that can be described as follows:
The child has already been separated from the noncustodial parent, al-
though some relationship may have been maintained. Attachment to the
custodial parent, particularly for a young child, is likely to have increased
during the post-divorce period. Then, if a change in custody is granted,
the child is required to readjust to yet another separation experience.
Several factors are noteworthy. First, bond disruption is not a necessary
consequence of separation from the custodial parent. In most situations,
the original custodial parent will remain in contact with the child. More
importantly, the child will have been familiar with the new custodian
prior to the separation. The presence of a familiar adult may help the
child maintain bonds. The more closely that parent follows the child's
known daily routines, maintains similar patterns of discipline and child
rearing, and encourages the child to develop his attachment to the new
custodian, the less likely it is that deleterious effects will follow.' 6 7 Second,
163. See Lamb, Effects of Stress and Cohort on Mother-and Father-Infant Interaction, 12 DEv.
PSYCHOLOGY 435, 441-42 (1976); Lamb, Twelve-Month-Olds and Their Parents: Interaction in a
Laboratory Playroom, 12 DEv. PSYCHOLOGY 237, 242-43 (1976); Radin, The Role of the Lawyer for
the Preschool Child in Custody Litigation, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 431, 443 (1981).
164. M. RuTTER, supra note 161, at 141-42; Ainsworth, Infant-Mother Attachment, 34 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 932, 935-36 (1979).
165. See generally M. RuTTER, supra note 161, at 102-08 (discussing deleterious effects of fail-
ure to form bonds and of disruption of bonds).
166. In some cases, the initial custody decision will be made only after a period of time in which
the child has lived exclusively with one parent. In this situation, concerns about instability, changes of
residence, and separation from established attachment figures that are incidents of custody modifica-
tion also attend the initial custody determinations. Subsequent decisions should not be based solely on
the length of time the child has spent with one parent or the other during the predivorce separation
period. Other factors, aside from where the Fates may have adventitiously placed the child, should be
considered.
167. Films made by two researchers, Robertson and Robertson, illustrate the acute distress that
often occurs when children are separated from their parents and placed in a strange and potentially
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there is support for the proposition that other circumstances, such as the
lack of environmental stimulation, and not the bond disruption itself, in-
fluence certain effects of bond disruption, such as the impairment of cog-
nitive skills."6 8 Thus, the type of care the child receives from the new
custodial parent may be crucial.
Despite the possibility that the effects of separation from the custodial
parent can be minimized or even eliminated, the risks involved for very
young children are too great to ignore. Although a great deal is still un-
known or imperfectly known about the attachment mechanism, there is an
accumulation of evidence about the need to develop an attachment bond in
infancy. Whether that bond is to the mother or the father is irrelevant.1 6 9
For children under three years of age, stability during the post-divorce
period in order to develop and maintain this bond without further disrup-
tion is quite important.170
Case law under the traditional modification standard pays lip service to
the importance of attachment. In order to give appropriate weight to this
factor, however, as well as to the other factors noted above, it is necessary
to abrogate standardless standards in favor of rules that provide clearer
limits on decisionmaking.
C. Areas for Future Research
The available social science data supports the adoption of the stricter
modification standard. There is, however, a need for further empirical re-
search. The call for an interdisciplinary approach to custody adjudication
has long been heard, but in order for the courts and legislatures to re-
spond to the pertinent findings of other disciplines, those other disciplines
must examine the factors that are relevant to the legal issue of custody
stressful situation. Robertson & Robertson, Young Children in Brief Separation: A Fresh Look, 26
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 264, 312-13 (1972). The Robertsons also made films
of children who were separated from their parents but who remained with the Robertsons in a small
family setting. They found that distress was greatly alleviated for those children over two years old.
The children received good maternal care, the Robertsons were somewhat familiar to the children,
they knew a great deal about the children and their patterns of family life, and they took special care
to talk about the separation. Id. at 295-97, 310-11.
168. See, e.g., M. RUTTER, supra note 161, at 84-87; Tizard & Tizard, The Social Development
of Two-Year Old Children in Residential Nurseries, in THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN SOCIAL RELA-
TIONS 147, 158 (H. Schaffer ed. 1971). It is important to note that these findings relate only to effects
on intellectual functioning, conduct disorders, and social development and not to emotional or behav-
ioral consequences of deprivation. See M. RUTTER, supra note 161, at 87-88. See also Davis, Use
and Abuse of the Power to Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 563-64
(1983-84) (challenging correlation between "separation per se and psychological harm").
169. M. RUTTER, supra note 161, at 121, 127.
170. One authority has suggested that a child old enough to have become attached to a primary
custodian (seven or eight months), but not old enough (under three years) to sustain an attachment
over a period of absence, is substantially stressed by separations. See A. CLARKE-STEWART, CHILD
CARE IN THE FAMILY 29-32 (1977).
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modification. Thus, for example, the assumption that post-divorce custody
litigation results in more interparental conflict should be examined to de-
termine whether such litigation might be cathartic, rather than fuel the
fires of hostility. Even if litigation does increase marital hostilities, the
possibility that parents can separate these feelings from their relationships
with their children should be assessed.
Legal decisionmakers also need more specific information about how
legal rules and procedures affect relationships. The effects of modification
standards should be examined both in jurisdictions that have relatively
strict standards and in those that have more relaxed standards. Do stricter
standards actually result in less litigation and less stress, or does the in-
ability to bring modification proceedings increase hostility? In those juris-
dictions that use the UMDA standard, what effect, if any, has the two-
year "waiting period" had on post-divorce adjustment? Does litigation or
stress increase after the "waiting period" has run? Does the "waiting pe-
riod" in fact screen out frivolous custody applications, or do courts in
practice largely ignore the procedural barrier? Does the UMDA ap-
proach promote the healthy functioning of the children of divorced fami-
lies so that, based on some broad measure of adjustment, one could argue
that the children of divorce in a UMDA jurisdiction are somehow "better
off"?
In addition, more information is needed about choosing between alter-
native arrangements for children. Although there is persuasive evidence
about the effects of parental conflict on children, there has been no effort
to compare, for example, whether a child would be better off living with
two antagonistic parents or with one parent who is overburdened and may
have some difficulties in meeting parental responsibilities, but who pro-
vides consistency.
In view of the likelihood that divorced parents will remarry, a number
of additional factors also need further analysis. The research in this area
has concentrated solely on the remarriage of the custodial parent. The
effect of the remarriage of the noncustodian, particularly when a custodial
change is also involved, should be examined. In addition, the timing of the
remarriage, the sex of the stepparent and of the child, and the time be-
tween divorce and remarriage, may well be salient variables.
There is also a need for further research about the effects of a change
in residence on a child. Research related to environmental stress that does
not treat moving as an independent variable is not sufficient. For example,
the effect on a child's development of a shift to new physical surroundings
with a new custodian, and the question of whether those effects vary de-
pending on a child's age, are still unexamined.
This research agenda is not only lengthy, it is extraordinarily complex.
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In particular, the task of determining cause and effect relationships with
regard to the increase or decrease of litigation would require empirical
methodologies that are as yet but gleams in the academician's eye. Never-
theless, the task is an important one, and it deserves attention.
The available empirical data provide compelling policy reasons for
adopting a new stricter standard for custody modification. Either legisla-
tive change or judicial reinterpretation of what truly is in the best interests
of the children of divorce could implement this stricter standard. More-
over, aside from the strong policy reasons for adopting such a standard,
constitutional principles may require it.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The federal Constitution neither requires the state legislatures to make
wise legislative decisions nor invalidates legislative decisions simply be-
cause they may constitute bad public policy. Are there nonetheless consti-
tutional principles that compel the fifty states to adopt some particular
standard or rule for custody modification decisions? This question raises
two issues. First, is a post-divorce familial unit entitled to constitutional
protection? Second, if it is, how should the rights of the custodial and
noncustodial parents be balanced against each other and against the inter-
ests of the state?
It may be useful to begin the inquiry with a hypothetical somewhat
removed from the issue posed above. Assume that a governmental entity
decided in its wisdom that David Jones, the son of Mr. and Mrs. Jones, is
underachieving because his parents do not appreciate his abilities and are
not giving him sufficient opportunities to develop his talents. Accordingly,
in order to help David, the government determines that he should be re-
moved from the Jones' house and placed with the Greens, who have ex-
pressed interest in assisting David to achieve.
It is safe to say that no court would countenance such action. Even
disputatious law professors would unanimously take the view that such
action was beyond the constitutional pale. And that is so even though the
family is not mentioned in the Constitution, and the constitutional source
for such protection is not self-evident. The Supreme Court recognized
long ago, based on what at the time was an orthodox substantive due
process analysis, that the parent-child relationship is entitled, at least in
some contexts, to constitutional protection from state intrusion."'
The protection to which the parent-child relationship is entitled in a
custodial modification proceeding is a novel issue, more complicated than
171. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to choose education of one's
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same).
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others that the courts have addressed. Two parent-child relationships con-
front one another and vie for recognition. The state, rather than asserting
its power to intervene ab initio, is asked "merely" to choose the "proper"
parent. Nonetheless, when a child is removed from its post-divorce custo-
dial parent as a result of a modification proceeding, it is the state which
effects that removal, pursuant to state laws, rules, and standards. There-
fore it is appropriate to inquire whether the Constitution sets any limits to
the exercise of that power.
A. Sources of a Constitutional Right to Family Privacy
The possible sources of support for a constitutional right to family pri-
vacy or integrity were perhaps most closely analyzed in Griswold v. Con-
necticut.7 '2 At issue in Griswold was a law that made the use of contra-
ceptives a criminal offense. The Supreme Court struck down the statute,
but few of the Justices agreed upon the constitutional basis for that
result.' 73
172. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
173. Justice Douglas, in a plurality opinion concurred in by three other Justices, concluded from
numerous constitutional provisions that there existed "penumbral [constitutional] rights of privacy and
repose," id. at 485, which protected the intimacies of married life from government intrusion. Because
the anti-contraceptive law at issue in Griswold invaded that protected zone of privacy, it was, in
Justice Douglas' view, unconstitutional, seemingly no matter what government interest it sought to
serve. In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg, joined by two other Justices, wrote separately in
order to emphasize the importance of the Ninth Amendment. Acknowledging that the Ninth Amend-
ment had received little attention from the Court or from the legal profession in general, Justice
Goldberg wrote:
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right oE
privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words
by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to
give it no effect whatsoever. Moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamental right is
not protected by the Constitution because it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the
first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the Ninth Amendment,
which specifically states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people . .. ."
Id. at 491-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Goldberg then proceeded to dis-
cuss which rights were so fundamental as to be protected under the Ninth Amendment: "[J]udges are
not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to
the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted
[there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental."' Id. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)). By this somewhat different road, Justice Goldberg reached the same conclusion as
Justice Douglas-that "the right of privacy is a fundamental personal right." 381 U.S. at 494.
Justice Harlan concurred in the Griswold judgement, but not in the reasoning of either Justice
Douglas' or Justice Goldberg's opinions. In his view, "the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is
whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"'. Id. at 500
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Justice Harlan cryptically found that it
did. 381 U.S. at 500.
Justice White also concurred with the judgment, but on other reasoning. He found that the statute
"deprivels married couples] of 'liberty' without due process of law, as that concept is used in the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 502. Rather than framing the issue in absolutist terms, however,
Justice White balanced interests. Citing a series of earlier cases involving family rights, he wrote:
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Debate concerning the source of constitutional limits to the states' pow-
ers to 'act in family matters has advanced little in the twenty years since
Griswold. The Court has not provided any new analysis of the issue. All
that has happened is that the several analyses presented by the individual
Justices in Griswold have gone in and out of fashion. Justice Douglas'
penumbral analysis has receded into the shadows from whence it came.
Justice Goldberg's forgotten Ninth Amendment has once again been for-
gotten. The view advanced by Justices Black and Stewart in their
dissents-that the courts engage in a dangerous enterprise when they rely
for constitutional interpretation upon subjective "due process" or "natural
justice" analysis-has gained considerable attention, if not currency. Yet
Black and Stewart's view remains a minority opinion. Despite cogent crit-
icism of substantive due process, 174 that approach remains alive and well
in the field of what might be called "family rights."
Meyer v. Nebraska175 is then quite pertinent to the issue at hand.
Meyer, decided by the Court in 1923, was one of the first substantive due
process family law cases, yet it reads very much as if it were decided last
Term. Meyer involved a statute that forbade the teaching of any modern
language other than English in the first eight grades. In the course of
striking down the statute on substantive due process grounds, Justice Mc-
Reynolds, writing for the Court, contrasted American values with those of
Plato's Republic. Plato's scheme contemplated that children would live
with and be brought up by official guardians. Justice McReynolds indi-
cated that such a plan would, if enacted by some radical state legislature,
quickly be struck down by the courts:
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and
State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions
rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to
both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
17 6
"These decisions affirm that there is a 'realm of family life which the state cannot enter' without
substantial justification." Id. at 502 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
Justice White found that the State's interest in the anti-contraception statute was insufficient to justify
the intrusion.
Justices Black and Stewart dissented because they could find nothing in the Constitution which
guaranteed family privacy. They criticized the other justices for employing what they characterized as
a standardless substantive due process approach to constitutional adjudication. 381 U.S. at 507-531
(Black, J,, and Stewart, J., dissenting in separate opinions).
174. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
175. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
176. Id. at 402.
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In other words, it is inconceivable in America for the government to
pluck David Jones from his home simply on the ground that he would be
better off in another. To be sure, if parents, for example, were seriously
abusing a child, the state might, consistent with the Constitution, inter-
vene and remove him from his home."' But this intervention cannot be
justified without a finding of abuse. As the Supreme Court recently said:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended
"[ilf a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest." 8
The Constitution surely reserves to the people the right to decide for
themselves how to try to maximize the development of their own
children-whether by having a home life that emphasizes human affec-
tion, or academic skills, or religion, or cultural affinity, or materialism, or
other values. While the Constitution allows state intervention to prevent
parents from falling below a minimum level of tolerable behavior toward
their children, it prohibits the states from intervening in other cases. Not
only is the government incompetent to decide such things-who is to say
how lives are to be lived and what values are best?-the government sim-
ply has no business making such choices.
177. See, e.g., Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Re-
moval of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Ter-
mination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 642 (1976); Note, The Right to Family Integ-
rity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 GEo.
L. J. 213, 240-45 (1979).
178. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Justice Stewart's concurrence in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977), which first expressed this
view). The Court so wrote, in passing and without explanation, in the course of holding that an
unwed father's rights were not violated when the adoption of his child was permitted by application of
a best interest standard, as opposed to a finding of his unfitness. See infra p. 811.
The quoted passage would seem to make invalid certain state neglect laws which have long been the
subject of criticism. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), holding that due process required
proof by clear and convincing evidence of neglect before parental rights could be terminated, the Court
stated: "Nor is it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate a parent's rights without show-
ing parental unfitness." Id. at 760 n.10 (emphasis in original). See Developments in the Law-the
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1315-22 (1980); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, supra
note 95; Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child
Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 930-32 (1975); Wald, supra note 177; Note, supra note
177. Several lower federal courts and state courts have recognized limitations on the scope of state
intervention. See, e.g., Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 26 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (constitutional
limitations on procedures of termination proceedings), affd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); Roe v.
Connecticut, 417 F. Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (constitutional right to "family integrity" re-
quires state to demonstrate compelling interest before abrogation); State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713,
716, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1978) (due process limits state regulation of families); State v. McMaster,
259 Or. 291, 298-301, 486 P.2d 567, 570-71 (1971) (discussing constitutional doctrines of vagueness
and due process in context of termination proceedings).
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B. The Custody Modification Context
If the state may not take a child from her home in order simply to
"improve" her upbringing, are there not similar constitutional brakes
upon the state's power to take a child from a custodial parent on the sole
grotind that the removal is in the "best interests of the child"?
The two situations are, of course, different in several respects. One dif-
ference is that a biological parent is initiating the removal process, not the
state or a third party. A second difference is that, if removed, the child
would live with a biological parent, not with a non-relative. Finally, the
home from which the child would be removed is already in a sense a
"broken" home, because the child has once before been the subject of a
custody decision.
Do these distinctions make a difference? To attempt to answer this
question requires an examination of the nature of the family unit after
divorce.
1. The Post-Divorce Family Unit
In one sense, the issue presented is: What is a family for purposes of
the recognition of constitutional rights? We know what a family is prior
to divorce, even though it may not be a particularly well-functioning one.
In the ongoing nuclear family, custody refers to the existing relationship
between parents and their child. The term encompasses a complex bundle
of rights and obligations: Parents have a right to supervise, care for, and
educate their child, the child has a right to receive support and mainte-
nance from his parents, and both have rights to inherit from one another
and to recover for injury tortiously inflicted on the other.179 After divorce,
the family unit is dissolved, and these rights and obligations are divided.
To some extent, the parties themselves can define the post-divorce fam-
ily. At the time of divorce, the parents can consensually allocate custody
and decide other issues themselves. 180 If the parents cannot agree, how-
ever, the courts are compelled to decide the issue. It is then the courts'
responsibility to determine which parent would be "best" for the child
and to allocate custody, companionship, and authority rights accordingly.
179. See H. Clark, supra note 7, at 573.
180. Note, supra note 177, at 230. Most state statutes provide that each parent has equal rights
to the custody of the child. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1983) ("In all
cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent"); ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.20.060(b) (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)
(West 1983); HAWAIi REV. STAT. § 571-46 (Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(2) (1973).
Moreover, thirty states have some form of joint or shared custody statute. FLR's 1983 Survey of
American Family Law, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3017, 3024-25 (Jan. 17, 1984). See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(3) (Baldwin 1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. 40-4-9.1 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(1)(b) (West 1984).
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This function of the courts is not objectionable because it is a function that
has been forced upon the courts by both parents.
Typically, the initial custodial decree, by separating and dividing the
elements of the custodial relationship, awards sole custody to one parent
and the right to visit the child on some periodic basis to the other."8' Un-
less some other arrangement is made, usually one that has been agreed to
by the parents, the parent with "legal custody" has the right to make
decisions about the child's education, religious training, residence, and
medical treatment. Generally, this parent also has "physical" or "actual"
custody which entitles her to control the child's daily activities such as
sleeping, eating, and recreation." 2 The rights and obligations of the non-
custodial parent are a good deal more limited. Typically, that parent loses
all power with respect to major decisions. The non-custodial parent's in-
fluence over day-to-day childrearing activities is limited to the period of
visitation, and visitation itself is frequently confined to a brief time. Thus,
the award of legal custody is highly significant.
Splitting the original intact nuclear family in this way forms a new
familial unit consisting of the custodial parent and child.' 8 3 This unit,
consistently referred to by sociologists and statisticians as a single-parent
family, should be recognized as a family relationship entitled to constitu-
tional protection. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,'8 4 the Supreme
Court made clear that it is not only the nuclear family that is entitled to
constitutional protection.
181. The state statute may specifically delineate the rights of the custodial and noncustodial par-
ents. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.330 (Baldwin 1984) ("Except as otherwise agreed by the
parties in writing at the time of the custody decree, the custodian may determine the child's upbring-
ing, including his education, health care, and religious training .... "). The judicial decree on visita-
tion may be the result of parental agreement or a litigated contest. The court has discretion in deter-
mining the scope and amount of visitation; the award may be for "reasonable" visitation or it may
specify the exact dates and time. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FAMILY LAW 431 (2d ed. 1976). Some state statutes explicitly refer to visitation rights. E.g., Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.320 (Baldwin 1984) ("A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to
reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger
seriously the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.").
182. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1366 n.1 (Utah 1982) (delineating rights embodied in rela-
tionship of legal custody). Under a joint, as opposed to a sole, custody award, legal custody and/or
physical custody may be divided in various ways. See Comment, Joint Custody: An Alternative for
Divorced Parents, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1084, 1087 (1979). For discussions of various joint custodial
arrangements, see P. WOOLLEY, THE CUSTODY HANDBOOK 102-12 (1979); Abarbanel, supra note
5, at 322; Benedek & Benedek, Joint Custody: Solution or Illusion?, 136 AM. j. PSYCHIATRY 1540,
1540-41 (1979); Ilfeld, Ilfeld & Alexander, Does Joint Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data
of Relitigation, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62, 62 (1982) (defining joint custody) [hereinafter cited as
Ilfeld]; Kelly, Further Observations on Joint Custody, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 762, 765-66 (1983);
Robinson,Joint Custody: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 21 J. FAM. L. 641, 651 n.26 (1983); Scott
& Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 455, 455 n.1 (1984).
183. See D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206, 365 A.2d 27, 29-30 (Ch. Div.)
(children after divorce belong to a different family unit than they did before divorce), affd per
curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
184. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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At issue in Moore was a city ordinance that limited the occupancy of a
dwelling unit to members of a single family. Mrs. Moore, a grandmother
who lived with her grandchildren, was convicted of violating the ordi-
nance, because the ordinance defined "family" in a way that excluded a
grandmother living with her grandchildren if those children were cousins
rather than siblings. The Supreme Court reversed her conviction, holding
the ordinance unconstitutional. The plurality found, in rather conclusory
fashion, that the city's claimed justifications for the ordinance-preventing
overcrowding, minimizing traffic problems, and avoiding financial bur-
dens on the school system-were only marginally served by the ordinance
and therefore did not outweigh the interests of family life upon which the
ordinance impinged."8 5
Having quickly reached that result, the plurality opinion embarked
upon an extraordinary defense of its mode of constitutional analysis. It
expressly acknowledged that criticism had been leveled at its substantive
due process type of analysis:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this
Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced pro-
tection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the
more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the
Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only
limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those
who happen at the time -to be Members of this Court. That history
counsels caution and restraint. 86
Nonetheless, the opinion continued, the substantive due process analysis is
the proper approach:
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from draw-
ing arbitrary lines but rather from careful "respect for the teachings
of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society.
1 87
Which such basic values were implicated in the case of the ordinance at
185. Id. at 499-500. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Powell and concurred in by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, cited substantive due process cases including Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925),
for the proposition that a "'private realm of family life [exists] which the state cannot enter."' 431
U.S. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). Justice Powell added that
"the family is not beyond regulation. But when the government intrudes on choices concerning family
living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation." Id. (citation omitted)
186. Id. at 502. (footnote omitted).
187. Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring)) (footnote omitted).
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issue in Moore? Citing to the Lochner era line of family law cases, the
plurality opinion stated: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."188 Then,
citing nothing more than census data, 8" a sociological study,190 and a
newspaper article,' 9 ' the plurality found that the "tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along
with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserv-
ing of constitutional recognition [as the traditional nuclear family living
arrangement].'
92
A dissenting opinion questioned what the ordinance at issue had to do
with the basic values that underlie our society.' 93 Justice Stewart pointed
out that the ordinance did not prevent parents from living either together
or with their children. Nor did it impede choices about procreation or
dictate how children may be raised. The Court was being asked instead to
rule that the "extended family" was so important in American society that
the states could not interfere with it.' This was too much for the dissent-
ers, including Justice White:
The suggested view would broaden enormously the horizons of the
[Due Process] Clause; and, if the interest involved here is any mea-
sure of what the States would be forbidden to regulate, the courts
would be substantively weighing and very likely invalidating a wide
range of measures that Congress and state legislatures think appro-
priate to respond to a changing economic and social order.
19 5
Justice White acknowledged that a grandmother's interest in living with
her grandchildren qualified as a liberty interest protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause.' 96 In his balance, however, the demands of the clause were
188. Id.
189. Id. at 504-05 n.14. The census data showed that many Americans now live in family pat-
terns other than that of the traditional nuclear family.
190. B. YORBURG, THE CHANGING FAMILY (1973).
191. Bronfenbrenner, The Calamitous Decline of the American Family, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1977,
at Cl.
192. 431 U.S. at 504. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, concluded that under the lim-
ited standard of review of zoning decisions, the ordinance had not been shown to have any "substan-
tial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare" of the city of East Cleveland and
thus constituted a taking of property without due process and without just compensation. In his view
the city had failed to explain the need for a rule that limited which of a homeowner's grandchildren
might live with her. Id. at 520-21.
193. Id. at 535-37 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 536-37.
195. Id. at 549-50 (White, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 550. According to Justice Stewart, Mrs. Moore's interest could not be equated with
the protected aspects of private family life:
The interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single kitchen and a suite
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met by a showing that the ordinance served a valid state interest. Accord-
ingly, the ordinance was, in his view, perfectly constitutional. 9 "
Although Justice White balanced the liberty interest against the State's
interest differently than did the Justices in the plurality, his approach to
the question hardly differed from theirs. In Griswold and in Moore, as in
all the other cases the Court has decided involving family rights, a major-
ity of the Justices seems committed to a mode of substantive due process
analysis. Moore is perhaps the most useful case for our analysis because it
clearly extended such protection beyond the traditional intact nuclear fam-
ily to a related familial group.
The Court treated "family-like" relationships quite differently in two
other cases, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno9 ' and
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,'99 suggesting possible boundaries for the
constitutional rights protected in Moore. In Moreno, the Court invalidated
a statute denying foodstamps to households consisting of unrelated per-
sons, holding that the use of this classification was not rationally related to
preventing fraud, the purported purpose of the statute.2 °0 Using minimal
scrutiny equal protection analysis, the Court in Belle Terre upheld a zon-
ing ordinance that prohibited more than two unrelated people from living
with one another.20' The Court stressed, however, that the statute did not
prevent an unmarried couple from cohabiting, suggesting that such
couples were entitled to protection as a family.
20 2
One might infer from reading Moreno and Belle Terre together that the
Court will grant some measure of protection to an extended family of
related individuals, but with respect to unrelated individuals only cohab-
iting couples are protected. The post-divorce family of the custodial parent
and child certainly comes closer to the traditional nuclear family than ei-
ther the extended family in Moore or the unrelated cohabiting couple
which the Belle Terre Court suggested may deserve protection. Moreover,
the post-divorce family appears to possess the other characteristics that the
Court, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Re-
form (OFFER),20 3 has suggested identify family relationships worthy of
constitutional protection.
of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply does not rise to that level. To equate this
interest with the fundamental decisions to marry and to bear and raise children is to extend the
limited substantive contours of the Due Process Clause beyond recognition.
Id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 550-51.
198. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
199. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
200. 413 U.S. at 537-38.
201. 416 U.S. at 7-9.
202. Id. at 8.
203. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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In Smith v. OFFER, the Court examined the possible due process lib-
erty interest of another type of "family"-a foster family. Although the
Court ultimately avoided determining when government activities affect-
ing foster families implicate constitutionally protected interests,20' the ma-
jority opinion provides some clues as to those attributes of a family rela-
tionship that would qualify it for constitutional protection. The Court
noted that the usual understanding of the term "family" implied the exis-
tence of a biological relationship." 5 Family ties, however, are not exclu-
sively biological: "[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the in-
dividuals involved and to the society, [also] stems from the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association .... ,,206
The Court noted that a foster parent and child might develop such emo-
tional ties, but the Court added that this relationship, unlike the one be-
tween a natural parent and child, originated in a state-made contract that,
by its terms, could be dismantled by the state.107 In the post-divorce fam-
ily, although the custodial parent acquires status by the assignment of
legal custody by the state, the custodial parent's rights derive from the
traditional rights belonging to the natural family. The award of legal cus-
tody merely confirms rights which the custodial parent has always had;
the noncustodial parent loses rights and begins a new legal relationship
with the child.
Justice Stewart, rejecting the idea that foster parents might have some
protectable liberty interest, pointed out another distinction in his concur-
rence: Unlike "family life" in a permanent home, the care provided by a
foster family was designed to be temporary. 08 Although a foster family
could provide emotional support and involvement, the relationship be-
tween foster parent and child could never compare to the stability of the
permanent commitment between a biological parent and child. 0 9
This concept of permanence may also help to explain the holdings in
Moore and Belle Terre. The group of unrelated students in Belle Terre
who sought to live together may have provided emotional support for one
another, but their relationship was transient. In Moore, in contrast, the
grandmother's relationship with her grandchildren was not only an emo-
tional one, it was also a permanent one. 10
204. Id. at 847. The Court assumed that the foster family was constitutionally protected and
decided the case on the narrower ground that New York's procedure for removal of foster children
from foster homes safeguarded this protected interest. Id. at 849-56.
205. Id. at 843. Biology was also recognized as an important factor in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979).
206. 431 U.S. at 844.
207. Id. at 845-46.
208. Id. at 856 (Stewart, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 861-63.
210. Justice Powell, in the plurality opinion in Moore, noted that the ordinance in Belle Terre
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The "private realm of family life" deserves most protection, these cases
suggest, where the factors of blood relationship, emotional support, and
stability coalesce. These factors are, of course, present in the traditional
nuclear family of a formally married couple and their children.21' But the
post-divorce family also exhibits these same factors and otherwise resem-
bles a traditional family except in one obvious respect. The post-divorce
family functions like the traditional nuclear family in a number of ways.
The custodial parent makes important decisions regarding the child and
has responsibility for a myriad of day-to-day caretaking tasks. The state
interests that support the respect traditionally accorded to parental, free-
dom in childrearing-to provide warm supportive bonds, to promote di-
versity, and to ensure that a child receives individualized care-are met
after divorce by the post-divorce family." 2 The Supreme Court has em-
phasized that "the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsi-
bilities they have assumed."2 Thus, rights of the custodial parent flow
from the duties and obligations that parent must fulfill with respect to the
child. Moreover, as the Court in Moore recognized, for a large segment of
society an extended family that includes only grandchildren and grandpar-
ents might meet these requirements. If a "family" missing both parents is
entitled to protection, a family missing only one parent should also receive
protection.
The issue of the extent of protection for a family's right of self-
determination is usually presented and analyzed in the context of a state's
acting to sever permanently the parental rights to a child.214 A modifica-
tion proceeding, of course, does not terminate the custodial parent's rights.
The loss of legal custody and the removal of the child from the post-
permitted cohabitation by all who were related by "'blood, adoption, or marriage."' 431 U.S. at 498
(Powell, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (quoting Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)).
211. The Supreme Court has consistently identified marriage as a family relationship entitled to
protection, in part because of the perceived permanence of the relationship. In the real world, of
course, marriage is somewhat less than a permanent condition.
212. Others have pointed out that the benefits theoretically provided by the nuclear family can be
provided by other "families," see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, supra note 2, at 11-13
(discussing children's needs), and that other "families" may therefore merit constitutional protection,
see Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1980) (conditions present in privacy context "apply outside the context of
biological parenthood or the family"); see also Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kin-
ship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463,
475-77, 559 (1983) (importance of family in enforcing basic values).
213. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2991 (1983). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations.").
214. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-57 (1982) (determining process due natural
parents in parental rights termination proceeding).
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divorce family do, however, seriously affect the rights of the custodial par-
ent to control the child's upbringing and limit the new post-divorce fam-
ily's interest in autonomy. To determine the constitutional standard under
which this action should be permitted, the rights of the noncustodial par-
ent must be examined.
2. The Rights of the Noncustodial Parent
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of competing
parental interests at the time of a custody modification application, several
cases suggest that in a situation involving a conflict between them, each
parent's interest should be separately assessed and weighed under a sub-
stantive due process approach. Despite the loss of legal custody, a right
which was shared with his spouse prior to divorce, the noncustodial par-
ent retains some rights pertaining to his child. Surely the noncustodial
parent's interest in his relationship with his child does not disappear
merely because they no longer live with each other.2 15 He may, for exam-
ple, be constitutionally entitled, absent a showing that his visits are doing
serious damage to the child, to the right of visitation. 11 6 But the issue here
is not whether the noncustodial parent has any protectable interest in his
relationship with his child; rather, it is how his rights relate to those of
the custodial parent.
The cases focusing on the rights of unwed fathers suggest how courts
might treat a conflict between individual parents outside of the context of
the intact nuclear family. Quilloin v. Wacott
17 and Lehr v. Robertson2 18
both involved adoptions of an unmarried father's child by the current hus-
band of the child's mother. In Quilloin the Supreme Court upheld a
Georgia statute that permitted the adoption of the child without the fa-
ther's consent where the father had never had actual or legal custody,
never lived with the child, and "never shouldered any significant responsi-
bility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care
of the child."2 19 Under these circumstances, the Court held that applica-
tion of a standard which authorized adoption if it was in the child's best
215. In Smith v. OFFER, the Court recognized the liberty interest of natural parents even though
their children had been removed from their homes. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 846-47 (discussing
liberty interest of parents who had voluntarily placed their children in foster homes). See also Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (postulating substantive parental
rights of father of legitimate child: "Even if it be assumed that each married parent after divorce has
some substantive due process right to maintain his or her parental relationship . . ").
216. See generally Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Unting the Triangular Knot, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REv. 121 (arguing that, absent parental unfitness, visitation right is constitutionally
protected).
217. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
218. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
219. 434 U.S. at 256.
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interests did not violate Mr. Quilloin's substantive rights.220 In Lehr, Mr.
Lehr sought a right to notice and the opportunity to be heard before his
child could be adopted. Like Mr. Quilloin, Mr. Lehr had never had a
significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with his daughter.
The Court ruled that the New York adoption procedures at issue ade-
quately protected the opportunity, which he had chosen not to take, to
establish a relationship with her.2
Unlike these fathers, a divorced parent seeking a modification of cus-
tody might well be a concerned parent who has both a prior and an on-
going relationship with his child. In such a case the protections requested
by Mr. Quilloin and Mr. Lehr might be constitutionally required if the
issue were the same.222 That, however, is not the case. By permitting the
adoption of the child in Quilloin and Lehr, the Court upheld the termina-
tion of the fathers' parental rights. The denial of a change of custody
petition does not terminate the parent-child relationship of the noncus-
todial parent and his child.
Moreover, in both these cases the Court noted that permitting the adop-
tions in question would foster the goal of stable family relationships. In
Quilloin, the Court stated that the result of the adoption would be "to
give full recognition to a family unit already in existence .... ,2 The
family unit in existence after divorce is the post-divorce family of custodial
parent and child. This family form, which functions much like a tradi-
tional nuclear family, should also be preferred and protected.224
Read together, Quilloin and Lehr support the contention of a noncus-
todial parent that he has some constitutionally protected interest in the
220. Id. at 254-55.
221. 103 S. Ct. at 2995-97.
222. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), involved competing claims between a mother
and father whose children were born out of wedlock. The mother and the father each married other
people, and the two new families both applied to adopt the children. The applicable adoption statute
required the consent of the mother for the adoption, but not of the father. The Court declared the
statute unconstitutional, stating that the state could not rely upon a statute favoring the mother "in all
circumstances." Id. at 394. Although the Court had no occasion to weigh the interests of the parents
against each other, it is noteworthy that the Court identified Mr. Caban as a father whose "relation-
ship with his children [was] fully comparable to that of the mother." Id. at 389. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on the fact that Mr. Caban had lived with his children for several years
and had participated in their upbringing.
223. 434 U.S. at 255.
224. In Caban v. Mohammed, Justice Stevens stated that the protection for the ""private realm
of family life,"' 441 U.S. at 414 n.27 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist,
J.) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (emphasis added by Justice Stevens),
did not extend to the two unwed parents and their children "because whatever family life once sur-
rounded . . . [them] has long since dissolved through no fault of the State's." Id. Instead, "it is the
State, rather than appellant, that may rely in this case on the importance of the family insofar as it is
the State that is attempting to foster the establishment and privacy of new and legitimate adoptive
families." Id.
The Yale Law Journal
child after divorce.225 But these cases shed little additional light upon
what showing, if any, the Constitution requires when a noncustodial par-
ent seeks to win custody on the ground that circumstances have so
changed that the noncustodial parent could do "better" for the child than
the custodial parent is doing. The cases suggest only that the virtually
standardless traditional custody modification test would be judged under
the virtually standardless substantive due process test of constitutional
propriety. At this point, the analysis must proceed on uncharted seas, and
the challenge is to do so with as principled a compass as possible.
3. Toward an Analysis of the Competing Interests
The issue at hand arises in one of two situations: either the parents
have agreed initially on a custodial arrangement, or the court has decided
the matter after the parents could not agree. Only in the second situation
has the state already intruded into the family's own private ordering of
itself prior to an application for custody modification.226
In the case of a consensual initial custody decision, governmental intru-
sion cannot be justified, absent a showing that the private arrangement is
affirmatively harming the child. We do not allow governmental intrusion
into the pre-divorce family without such a showing. Once the initial cus-
tody decision has been made, a new family unit exists; rights and obliga-
tions have shifted. Merely because the parent who chose to surrender cus-
tody subsequently comes to believe that the child could be doing "better"
with him is no reason for the government to invade the private choice the
family itself previously made. Government intervention would simply not
be proper: Absent proof that the private choice is affirmatively damaging
the child, the state is neither empowered nor competent to reorder the
choice made by the family. Such choices are committed in our system to
the family.221 7 Whether one invokes the First Amendment, as Justice
Douglas would,22 or the Ninth, with Justice Goldberg,229 the proposition
is indisputable: The state's power to remove a child from a post-divorce,
single-parent family should be no greater than the state's power to remove
a child from a pre-divorce two-parent family-the state can remove the
child only upon a showing that the child is seriously endangered.
Although the analysis becomes slightly more difficult when the initial
225. For other cases that support this position, see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389
(1979); Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647-49
(1972).
226. Theoretically, there is a third possibility-the court may have overridden the decision made
by the parents themselves. The courts, however, rarely exercise this power. See supra note 82.
227. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
228. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
229. Id. at 493-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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custody decision was not a private agreement, there are good reasons why
the same result should obtain. The state should not be able to remove the
child from the custodial parent on the sole ground that, upon reconsidera-
tion of its initial decision, the state finds that the other parent would be a
"better" custodian.
First, the justification for the state's initial intrusion-that the parents
could not agree on custody-no longer applies. No decision is being thrust
upon the courts; custody has already been allocated, and the matter be-
tween the two parents no longer stands in equilibrium. The state may not,
simply because a divorce once took place, rely upon a "shattered family"
rationale forever to justify its intervention and continuing jurisdiction over
the new family unit.
Furthermore, as noted at the outset, about one-third of this nation's
children will, during their minority, experience the divorce of their par-
ents. 30 The implications of a rule that authorizes the state to have contin-
uing jurisdiction over such a large number of children based on a changed
circumstances or best interests standard are Orwellian. Under the tradi-
tional standard of custody modification, the behavior of the custodial par-
ent is examined under a microscope, with the noncustodial parent and the
family court in the role of Big Brother. Has she nurtured her child suffi-
ciently in a manner acceptable to the court? Has she done anything else
that in the court's eye constitutes less than acceptable parenting? Has she,
as in the Friederwitzer case, done enough to inculcate the "proper" reli-
gious beliefs? Any rule of law that puts the government in a position to
oversee the most private of matters and sensitive of interests raises serious
constitutional questions.
It has been suggested here that the traditional modification standard
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, at least where the courts are
asked to overturn a consensual custody decision simply in order to "help"
the child do better than the child is doing in the privately reordered post-
divorce family. But while private choices should be entitled to more
weight than decisions made by the court, the courts at present are giving
less weight in modification proceedings to consensual initial decrees. 231
This analysis suggests that only a strict modification standard can pass
constitutional muster. A custodial parent should lose custody only when
there is actual or imminent risk of serious harm to the child and the po-
tential detriment to the child caused by remaining in the family outweighs
230. See supra note 1.
231. See supra Part I. See generally Sharp, supra note 3 (arguing for equal standard of proof for
modification of agreement-based and litigated custody decrees).
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the harms and disruptions that a change in custody would cause. The best
interests and change of circumstances standards, permitting "no-fault" in-
tervention in the post-divorce family, fail to provide adequate constitu-
tional protection to the custodial parent.
CONCLUSION
The crisis of custody decisionmaking is upon us. In proposing that cus-
tody decrees should be subject to modification only under very limited cir-
cumstances, this Article argues for one change in a system that as a whole
may require many changes. Indeed, the more stringent modification stan-
dard argued for here may itself generate pressures on other parts of the
system and thereby require further adjustments in order to effect the goal
of resolving custody disputes justly and efficiently.
For example, a change in the modification standard would likely have
implications for the initial custody decision and the way participants per-
ceive it. The more difficult it is to modify initial custody decisions, the
greater their significance. An amorphous modification standard encourages
parties to accept an initial decision to which they are not permanently
committed. Under a more exacting standard for modification, the parties
might give more thought and attention to the initial decision. That alone
might be beneficial; additional consideration generally makes for a better
decision.
This additional pressure on the initial decision might also result in
more initial litigation. Given the uncertainty of the best interests standard,
going to court to settle a custody dispute is quite risky. That risk may not
be worth taking if it is relatively easy to change the decision later. Under
a stricter standard, if the court's decision will be difficult to modify, the
risk analysis changes considerably. The parties will realize they must liti-
gate initially or hold their peace.
It is likely, however, that the vast majority of custody disputes will con-
tinue to be settled without judicial determination even if the standard for
modification is greatly tightened. An increased focus on the initial deci-
sion, rather than producing litigation, should encourage the use of mecha-
nisms that increase the likelihood that the decision reached will be a
compromise-a workable solution that gives something to both parties.23
232. As Mnookin and Kornhauser point out, the compromise reached may not be a better balance
of the parents' interests in the child's custody and welfare. Instead, one party is likely to sell out his or
her interests in the child's custody in exchange for relief from monetary support obligations. See
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 963-66. The point here is not that a consensual resolution
will result in a wise collective judgment by both parents as to what custodial relationship is in their
own best interests and the child's, but that the agreement, once reached, should be respected.
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Although the results are by no means in, there is some evidence that medi-
ation2"3 and joint custodial arrangements234 often are more satisfactory for
some parents and children than sole custody. The modification standard
proposed here should help parents to move consensually in that direction.
As for those disputes that are presented to the courts, the trial judge's
power and responsibility will increase. Currently, judges make their deci-
sions knowing that if circumstances and the interests of the child change,
custody can also be changed. If this possibility of modification is limited,
more attention will have to be paid to what judges do in the first instance.
For example, the decisions of the trial courts should be subject to appel-
late review requiring that trial courts state reasons that meet statutory
requirements.235
But rather than guess at what may or may not happen if the custody
modification standard is altered, empirical research should be done on
these very questions, and others identified earlier. For example, what has
been the experience in those, still quite few, states in which the UMDA
standard is applied? Much useful work remains to be done before we can
answer all of our questions related to custody modification with
confidence.
One thing, however, can be said with some certainty. Mrs. Smith, the
hypothetical parent discussed in the Introduction to this Article, would not
lose custody of her children if the standard urged here were applied. In
233. For the results of an empirical study relating to mediation, see Pearson, Child Custody: Why
Not Let the Parents Decide?, JuDGES' J., Winter, 1981, at 4. There has also been commentary on the
theoretical benefits of mediation. See, e.g., Meroney, Mediation and Arbitration of Separation and
Divorce Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 467 (1979); Spencer & Zammit, Mediation-
Arbitration: A Proposal for Private Resolution of Disputes between Divorced or Separated Parents,
1976 DUKE L.J. 911; Winks, Divorce Mediation: A Nonadversary Procedure for the No-Fault Di-
vorce, 19 J. FAM. L. 615 (1981); Note, Non-Judicial Resolution of Custody and Visitation Disputes,
12 U.C.D. L. REV. 582 (1979).
234. For studies whose results lend empirical support to theoretical assumptions about joint cus-
tody as a viable custody arrangement, see D. LUEPNrrz, supra note 139; Ahrons, Joint Custody
Arrangements in the Postdivorce Family, 3 J. DIVORCE 189 (1980); Ilfeld, supra note 182; Watson,
Custody Alternatives: Defining the Best Interests of the Children, 30 FAM. RE. 474 (1981). Cf
Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint-Custody Arrangement: A Report of a Study, 51
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403 (1981) (while joint custody requires considerable effort by parents
and children, available data suggest it may be beneficial to many but not all parents and children).
But see Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WomFN.'s RTs. L. REP. 235, 242 (1982) (statutorily mandated joint custody pre-
sumptions do not encourage joint child rearing; women continue to do primary or almost sole
parenting).
235. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jaramillo, 37 Colo. App. 171, 543 P.2d 1281, 1282 (1975)
("[Tihere must be some indication in the record that the trial court considered such of those [statu-
tory] factors as were pertinent, and the findings thereon must be sufficient to enable this court to
determine on what ground the trial court reached its decision . . . ."); Giordano v. Giordano, 93
A.D.2d 310, 312, 463 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98-99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) ("[E]ffective appellate review in
this case requires remittal to Family Court for the purpose of rendering a decision stating the facts
deemed essential, as required by CPLR § 4213 (subd. [b]).") (citation omitted).
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the long run, that result is a happy one-or perhaps more correctly, the
least unhappy one-for all members of the post-divorce family.
